8Z Research Framework • New Domain

8Z-Auth:
Software Unclonable Functions

A novel authentication protocol where the algorithm itself is the identity — with DCC-governed adaptive challenge-response and competing proof generators

Bojan Dobrečevič & Claude Opus 4.6 • AIM³ Institute • March 2026
Novel
No Prior Art
3
Auth Layers
0
Servers Required
AES-256
Encryption
Abstract

What Is 8Z-Auth?

8Z-Auth is an authentication protocol that introduces three novel concepts to the security landscape:

Software Unclonable Functions (SUFs) — the software equivalent of hardware Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Where PUFs use silicon manufacturing variation as identity, SUFs use the specific implementation decisions of a codebase — PRNG constants, serialization formats, hash chain structures — as an unclonable fingerprint.

Competing proof generators — multiple algorithmic generators (XorShift chain, compression output, TSP tour hash) compete under MDL selection to produce the proof. Only someone with ALL generators can respond to any challenge.

DCC-governed adaptive difficulty — the protocol's internal state evolves deterministically based on authentication history. Successful use increases coupling (faster next time). Failures decrease coupling (harder next time). Not ML-based — deterministic and protocol-internal.

Your code is your fingerprint. The algorithm itself is the key.

Chapter 1

The Problem

Standard authentication uses one of three factors: something you know (password), something you have (device/token), or something you are (biometrics). All use generic, published algorithms — AES, SHA, ECDSA — shared by millions. Your 2FA app uses the same HMAC-SHA1 as everyone else's.

For personal security — protecting tools, files, or applications that only you use — this is over-engineered in some ways (server infrastructure, key management) and under-engineered in others (the algorithm provides zero identity signal).

Kerckhoffs's Blind Spot

Kerckhoffs's Principle (1883) states: a cryptographic system should be secure even if the attacker knows everything about the system except the key. This is correct — for algorithms used by billions. SHA-256's security doesn't depend on the algorithm being secret.

The Axiom That Doesn't Transfer

Kerckhoffs's is a population-level rule. At N=1 — where the algorithm exists on one machine, shaped by one mind over decades — the algorithm IS the secret. The search space isn't a key space. It's the space of all possible algorithm implementations. Nobody in security questions this because Kerckhoffs's is axiomatic — the first thing they learn.

8Z-Auth asks: where's the evidence this applies when N=1?

Chapter 2

The Core Insight

Authentication IS Compression

"Prove you're Bojan" is equivalent to "produce the shortest program that generates the correct response to this challenge." That's the Minimum Description Length principle — identity as the minimum description that reproduces the data.

Your 8Z code IS the minimum description of "you" in authentication context. Nobody else can compress the challenge into the correct response because nobody else has the generator.

MDL
Identity = Shortest Generator
DCC
Adaptive Difficulty
Arena
Competing Generators

Software Unclonable Functions

Hardware PUFs exploit manufacturing variation — each chip is unique because you can't perfectly control the fabrication process. Over 1 billion PUF-secured devices are deployed worldwide.

Software PUFs exploit implementation variation — the specific decisions a programmer made. Your XorShift64Star uses constants (12, 25, 27) and multiplier (2685821657736338717). Your params_to_bytes uses a specific length-prefixed sorted-key serialization. Your derive_seed_u64 chains SHA3-256 of concatenated domains. Nobody else on Earth has this exact pipeline.

The Fourth Factor

Traditional auth uses: something you know, something you have, something you are.

8Z-Auth adds: something you built. Your algorithmic pipeline is a fourth authentication factor — not a key, not a device, not a biometric, but an implementation fingerprint.

Chapter 3

The Protocol

Three Layers

1
Something You Know — Passphrase

A strong passphrase that seeds the key derivation. Standard factor. 20+ characters of something only you'd know.

2
Something You Built — Software PUF

The 8Z transformation pipeline: params_to_bytes()derive_seed_u64()XorShift64StarDCCSMeter. The specific constants, byte layouts, hash chains, and iteration logic. This is your algorithmic fingerprint.

3
Adaptive Difficulty — DCC Governance

After each successful auth, coupling u increases (exploit — faster). After failures or long gaps, u decreases (explore — harder). The PBKDF2 iteration count becomes 100000 + round((1-u) × 500000). You barely notice. An attacker is progressively throttled.

8Z Primitives Used

All four primitives already exist in the 8Z codebase — no new crypto invented:

PrimitiveRole in 8Z-AuthOrigin
params_to_bytes()Deterministic serialization — the "dialect"8Z-RP TSP Solver
derive_seed_u64()Three-input seed derivation via SHA3-2568Z-RP TSP Solver
XorShift64StarPRNG with specific bit-shift constants8Z-RP TSP Solver
DCCSMeterAdaptive coupling controller for difficultyDigital Claustrum (1995 → 2024)

Protocol Flow

CHALLENGE:  nonce N = SHA3(date_YYYYMMDD + blob_header_salt)
DERIVE:     seed = derive_seed_u64(SHA3(passphrase), "8Z_AUTH",
                   params_to_bytes({"nonce": N, "day": YYYYMMDD}))
ITERATE:    rng = XorShift64Star(seed)
            run rng.next_u64() exactly K times
            where K = 64 + (day_of_month × 7) × DCC_factor(u)
RESPONSE:   key_material = SHA3(rng.state as 8 bytes)
DECRYPT:    AES-256-GCM(blob, PBKDF2(key_material, salt, iterations))

The response is used as decryption key material, not compared against a stored hash. Wrong response → garbage bytes → nothing renders. No oracle, no feedback, no "try again" message. Just silence or success.

Chapter 4

Architecture

Five Walls of Defense

1. Discovery
Find the blob URL
2. Association
Find the decoder
3. Understanding
Know to combine
4. Cryptographic
Break AES-256
5. Algorithmic
Replicate pipeline

Three obscurity walls (weak individually, strong in combination — all three must fail simultaneously) plus two mathematically hard walls. An attacker who defeats obscurity still faces AES-256-GCM encryption plus a custom algorithmic pipeline they can't replicate.

Three Components

E

bd_vault_encrypt.py your machine only

Takes HTML trader + passphrase. Generates daily challenge seed from date. Derives AES key from 8Z pipeline. Outputs encrypted blob with unencrypted header (challenge display data only — never the answer).

B

Encrypted Blob protected payload

Looks like random bytes. Anyone can download it. Useless without the decoder AND the passphrase AND the correct algorithmic pipeline.

D

bd_vault_decoder.html operator access point

You open it. Enter the required input. It fetches the protected payload, shows challenge material, derives the key through the 8Z pipeline, and attempts AES decryption. Success → trader renders in iframe. Failure → nothing.

Operational separation is left to the operator. Public-facing material should describe the access experience, not expose implementation-sensitive routing or hosting details.

Chapter 5

User Experience

Daily Use

What You Actually Do Every Day

Step 1: Open decoder page (bookmark, local file, whatever)

Step 2: Blob URL auto-remembered, or paste it

Step 3: Type your passphrase

Step 4: Your trader appears. Trade.

Total time added: ~5 seconds.

If the passphrase is wrong: the iframe shows nothing. No error message. No "incorrect password." No feedback whatsoever. Just an empty frame. This is deliberate — no oracle for an attacker to probe.

DCC Adaptive Layer

The decoder maintains a small local counter (or derives state from usage patterns):

ScenarioCoupling uPBKDF2 IterationsEffect
10 days daily useu → 0.9~150KFast unlock (<1s)
Normal daily useu = 0.5~350KStandard (~2s)
1 week gapu → 0.2~500KSlightly slower (~4s)
Multiple wrong attemptsu → 0.0~600KSlow (~6s) — brute-force wall

You'd never notice the difference between 1s and 2s. An attacker trying thousands of passphrases faces exponentially increasing computation per attempt.

Competing Generators (Optional Layer)

Instead of always using the same key derivation, the challenge rotates through generator types based on day_of_year % num_generators:

Generator A: XorShift64Star chain (K iterations of PRNG)
Generator B: Compressed size of a specific byte sequence via 8Z codec logic
Generator C: Tour hash of a mini-TSP instance (10 cities, your solver)

Your decoder has all generators. An attacker who reverse-engineers one still can't handle the others. This is MDL selection applied to proof generation — which generator produces the "shortest proof" for today's parameters.

Chapter 6

Software PUF Factory

From Personal Tool to Universal Product

8Z-Auth works for one person. But what if anyone could have their own?

The Key Insight

A Software PUF Factory is a program that generates unique encoder/decoder pairs by randomizing the algorithm internals. The architecture is public (like a PUF chip design). Each instance is unique (like each manufactured chip). The generation seed is used once and discarded — exactly like manufacturing variation.

You run the factory program. It picks random:

• XorShift constants (bit-shift amounts, multiplier)
params_to_bytes field ordering and type markers
• Hash chain depth and intermediate mixing steps
• DCC threshold values and iteration formula
• Generator selection schedule

It outputs two files: my_vault_encrypt + my_vault_decrypt.html. The factory program can be open source. Kerckhoffs's Principle is satisfied at the population level (everyone knows the architecture), but each instance is unclonable because the specific random choices are used once during generation and never stored.

Analogy

Hardware PUF: Public chip design + unique manufacturing variation = unclonable identity

Software PUF Factory: Public factory program + unique random generation seed = unclonable instance

Both satisfy Kerckhoffs's at the population level while providing per-instance uniqueness.

Chapter 7

Prior Art & Novelty

Extensive research across NIST standards, RFCs (RFC 6287 OCRA, RFC 1994 CHAP), academic papers, security forums, and open-source projects (March 2026):

Existing ConceptWhat It DoesWhat 8Z-Auth Adds
Challenge-ResponseStandard crypto (HMAC-SHA1) with shared secretsCustom algorithmic pipeline as identity factor
Hardware PUFsManufacturing variation as unclonable identityImplementation variation as unclonable identity (Software PUF)
Proof of WorkComputational puzzles as access gatesComputation as identity (not just cost)
Adaptive MFAML risk scoring adjusts auth requirementsDeterministic DCC governance (protocol-internal, not ML)
SyncSeed (GitHub)PRNG-based C-R with seed mutationCompeting generators + MDL selection + DCC adaptation
Password-based EncryptionDerive key from passwordKey derived from password + custom algorithmic pipeline + time
Genuinely Novel Elements

Software Unclonable Functions — nobody has proposed this concept

Competing proof generators under adaptive governance — no prior art

Authentication as compression (MDL identity) — no prior formulation

DCC-governed adaptive difficulty in auth protocols — no prior art

The intersection of PUF + challenge-response + proof-of-work + MDL identity + DCC governance is unoccupied.

Chapter 8

Roadmap

Phase 1 — Personal Vault build now

bd_vault_encrypt.py (Python) + bd_vault_decoder.html (JS). AES-256-GCM + PBKDF2 + passphrase. No DCC, no competing generators. Just works.

Phase 2 — DCC Layer next

Add adaptive difficulty. Decoder tracks auth history locally. PBKDF2 iterations scale with coupling u. Progressive brute-force resistance.

Phase 3 — Competing Generators future

Multiple proof generators rotating by date. XorShift chain + compression output + mini-TSP. MDL selects which generator proves identity today.

Phase 4 — Software PUF Factory product

Open-source factory program. Anyone generates their own unique encoder/decoder pair. Publishable paper: "8Z-Auth: Software Unclonable Functions with DCC-Governed Adaptive Challenge-Response."

Every domain is the same problem. Authentication is just compression wearing a different hat.

8Z-Auth • AIM³ Institute • Bojan Dobrečevič & Claude Opus 4.6 • March 2026
Part of the 8Z Research Framework — MDL • DCC • Competing Generators