Paul L. Leventhal

1938 – 2007

"It may take the unthinkable happening before the political process can screw up the courage to put an end to this ridiculously dangerous industry."

An Uncredited Service to the Planet

Paul L. Leventhal was a visionary who recognized the apocalyptic overlap between commercial nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation long before it was widely accepted. Before founding the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in 1981, he operated at the highest levels of the U.S. government to force accountability onto a dangerously unregulated industry.

As a senior staff member in the U.S. Senate, Paul was the architect of the 1974 law that shattered the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, breaking it into independent regulatory and promotional agencies to eliminate its inherent conflict of interest. He spearheaded the investigation and legislation that became the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, establishing the modern framework for strict nuclear export controls. In 1979, he co-directed the Senate’s bipartisan investigation into the Three Mile Island meltdown, the most serious commercial reactor failure in U.S. history.

Refusing to accept the compromise that "Atoms for Peace" was safe from becoming "Atoms for War," Paul founded NCI to serve as an independent, relentless watchdog. For 22 years as President, he stood against immense corporate and governmental pressure to expose the sheer madness of a global plutonium economy.

The Prophecies Fulfilled

NCI was routinely criticized by the nuclear industry as alarmist. Yet, history has vindicated Paul Leventhal and his institute time and time again. The warnings they issued decades ago are now recognized as foundational truths of global security.

The Fallacy of the Plutonium Economy

The Warning: NCI argued that separating plutonium via reprocessing for commercial fuel (MOX) was an economic failure and a proliferation nightmare. Industry claimed it was the fuel of the future.
The Truth: Today, the commercial breeder reactor dream is dead. Almost all nations have abandoned reprocessing due to astronomical costs and unmanageable security liabilities, exactly as Paul predicted.

The Elimination of Civilian HEU

The Warning: NCI campaigned relentlessly to expose that over 150 civilian research reactors worldwide were running on Highly Enriched Uranium (bomb-grade material), creating a massive terrorism loophole.
The Truth: Through NCI's pressure on the RERTR program, the global phase-out of civilian HEU in favor of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) is now a universally accepted, primary objective of the IAEA and global security summits.

Vulnerability to Nuclear Terrorism

The Warning: In 1986, Paul convened the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, warning that reactors and transport ships were prime targets for catastrophic sabotage by non-state actors.
The Truth: Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the world woke up to the exact asymmetric threats NCI had spent 15 years mapping out, validating their campaigns to upgrade truck-bomb rules and operational safeguard responses.

Stopping the Air Transport of Plutonium (1987)

The Warning: NCI uncovered a reckless plan to fly shipments of highly toxic plutonium from Europe to Japan via Alaska without crash-proof casks.
The Truth: By exposing this to the public and Congress, NCI successfully forced the cancellation of the flights, averting a potential global environmental catastrophe.

The Vanguard: Co-Workers and Allies

Paul did not fight this battle alone. He assembled a brilliant, dedicated team of theoretical physicists, researchers, and policy analysts at NCI who executed this watchdog mission with unmatched technical rigor and determination.

Dr. Edwin Lyman

Scientific Director / President

A theoretical physicist from Cornell University, Dr. Lyman provided the undeniable mathematical and scientific proof of the dangers of MOX fuel. His research definitively modeled the catastrophic cancer risks of severe accidents and exposed the gaping safety holes in the sea transport of high-level nuclear waste.

Steven Dolley

Research Director

Joining NCI in 1991, Dolley was the institute's intelligence hub. He rigorously tracked global plutonium stockpiles, exposed vulnerabilities in international safeguard inspections, and authored critical reports tracking the illicit trafficking of Highly Enriched Uranium and Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

Sharon Tanzer

Vice President

A vital architect of NCI's global reach, Tanzer organized international conferences across Europe, Latin America, and Japan. She co-edited seminal works on nuclear terrorism and arms control, ensuring NCI's technical warnings were translated into coordinated, international diplomatic pressure.

Tom Clements

Executive Director

A fierce advocate who spearheaded grassroots and international campaigns. Clements led the charge against the Department of Energy's disastrous MOX fuel consortiums and fought on the front lines against the dangerous maritime shipments of plutonium from Europe to Asia.

Alan Kuperman

Senior Consultant

A highly effective policy analyst who drove NCI's legislative strategies. Kuperman focused heavily on the U.S. program to eliminate the use of bomb-grade HEU in research reactors and co-authored the landmark 1987 report that successfully halted the airborne shipment of plutonium to Japan.

NCI Intelligence Archive

Direct extraction of the statistics, policies, and enduring warnings from the Nuclear Control Institute's historical database.

Archival Presentation Project

CONTEXT: The data presented below is strictly extracted from the original NCI archives maintained under President Paul L. Leventhal. These are the exact warnings, statistics, and historical accounts published during the institute's active years, now algorithmically preserved to ensure these vital non-proliferation facts remain highly visible. (Includes deep-context metadata, source tracking, and entity resolution).

Critical Policy Warnings & Threats

Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: to quote or reprint material from this Web site is granted in advance so long as you make proper acknowledgement to the Nuclear Control Institute and you notify us as to the form and use made of the material. [Nuclear Terrorism Threat Could terrorists build a bomb with stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium?] Are reactors now adequately protected against sabotage?
"Nuclear Terrorism Threat Could terrorists build a bomb with stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium?"
Source: about-nci.htm
Title: Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), Washington D.C.
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Visit our conference site for online video interviews, videotapes, speeches, papers, programe & more! [Plutonium & Reprocessing Getting Rid of Military Plutonium Using plutonium from bombs as fuel for nuclear power reactors invites theft by terrorists and outlaw states.] How to stop this latest attempt at plutonium commerce: Directly dispose of plutonium by burying it with nuclear waste deep in the earth.
"Plutonium & Reprocessing Getting Rid of Military Plutonium Using plutonium from bombs as fuel for nuclear power reactors invites theft by terrorists and outlaw states."
Source: about-nci.htm
Title: Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), Washington D.C.
Entities: Plutonium & Reprocessing Getting Rid of Military Plutonium Using
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Is there an irreducible proliferation risk posed by plutonium production in reactors and by the prospect of cheap, efficient enrichment technology with virtually limitless sources of uranium? [Can this risk be overcome even if industry forswears recovery and use of plutonium from spent fuel?] Is the world better off without nuclear power?
"Can this risk be overcome even if industry forswears recovery and use of plutonium from spent fuel?"
Source: conf-program.htm
Title: NCI Conference Program
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: The Continuing Relevance of Nuclear Power to the Problem of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 1:45 paper How realistic are the technical fixes for making nuclear power proliferation-resistant and free of long-lived wastes? [Is it possible to transmute plutonium, or to make recovery and use of plutonium proliferation-resistant, or to render nuclear wastes free of weapons-usable material?] Overview: Marvin Miller, Senior Research Scientist, MIT.
"Is it possible to transmute plutonium, or to make recovery and use of plutonium proliferation-resistant, or to render nuclear wastes free of weapons-usable material?"
Source: conf-program.htm
Title: NCI Conference Program
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: However, a speck of plutonium lodged in the lung or bone can cause cancer. [Consequently, dispersal of a plutonium cargo in a severe crash could result in a health and environmental catastrophe.] Both the new air-shipment packaging code and the exemption from it put the public at risk.
"Consequently, dispersal of a plutonium cargo in a severe crash could result in a health and environmental catastrophe."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Like Dr. Makhijanis organization, IEER, NCI is greatly concerned about the accumulation of stockpiles of hundreds of tons of weapon-usable plutonium that is occurring in nations that reprocess spent nuclear fuel like the U.K. and France. [In comparison, the U.S. moratorium on reprocessing initiated by the Ford Administration, rooted in concern about the proliferation risks inherent in producing, processing and transporting vast quantities of plutonium --- was wise policy.] The U.S. currently faces a bill of at least $4 billion to dispose of a mere 34 metric tons of plutonium taken from dismantled nuclear warheads --- if the U.S. had continued down the path of civilian reprocessing 25 years ago, it is likely that the U.S. would have a few hundred additional tons of plutonium to add to this pile, with a corresponding increase in financial burden on taxpayers or electricity ratepayers.
"In comparison, the U.S. moratorium on reprocessing initiated by the Ford Administration, rooted in concern about the proliferation risks inherent in producing, processing and transporting vast quantities of plutonium --- was wise policy."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: the Ford Administration
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: The U.S. currently faces a bill of at least $4 billion to dispose of a mere 34 metric tons of plutonium taken from dismantled nuclear warheads --- if the U.S. had continued down the path of civilian reprocessing 25 years ago, it is likely that the U.S. would have a few hundred additional tons of plutonium to add to this pile, with a corresponding increase in financial burden on taxpayers or electricity ratepayers. [In spite of this, the Bush energy policy proposes that "the United States should reexamine its policies to allow for research, development and deployment" of so-called proliferation-resistant reprocessing technologies like pyroprocessing.] The policy also refers to a "new technology known as accelerator transmutation, which could be used in combination with reprocessing to reduce the quantity and toxicity of nuclear waste."
"In spite of this, the Bush energy policy proposes that "the United States should reexamine its policies to allow for research, development and deployment" of so-called proliferation-resistant reprocessing technologies like pyroprocessing."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: The policy also refers to a "new technology known as accelerator transmutation, which could be used in combination with reprocessing to reduce the quantity and toxicity of nuclear waste." [The idea is that these technologies could make it easier to dispose of nuclear waste while avoiding the proliferation risks associated with conventional reprocessing.] The political reasons for this recommendation are pretty clear.
"The idea is that these technologies could make it easier to dispose of nuclear waste while avoiding the proliferation risks associated with conventional reprocessing."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: In our judgment, the answer is a resounding NO! [Implementing DOEs ATW concept would vastly increase the environmental, safety and proliferation risks from nuclear power, cost taxpayers a fortune and almost certainly fail to achieve its primary purpose, which is to simplify nuclear waste disposal.] In 1999, DOE issued a report to Congress entitled "A Roadmap for Developing ATW Technology."
"Implementing DOEs ATW concept would vastly increase the environmental, safety and proliferation risks from nuclear power, cost taxpayers a fortune and almost certainly fail to achieve its primary purpose, which is to simplify nuclear waste disposal."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: ATW
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: It would be impossible to eliminate the risk that plutonium would be diverted or stolen by insiders. [Some people in DOE are aware of this threat, and for this reason have proposed that pyroprocessing, a so-called proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology, be used in the ATW system.] The promoters of pyroprocessing at Argonne National Laboratory-West in Idaho claim that it is a method in which plutonium can be safely recycled, because it never produces plutonium that is pure enough that it can easily be removed undetected, and would require further treatment before it could be used in a nuclear weapon.
"Some people in DOE are aware of this threat, and for this reason have proposed that pyroprocessing, a so-called proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology, be used in the ATW system."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: ATW, DOE
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Some remain in the salt, like most of the fission products, while uranium and plutonium are removed from the salt through deposition on different cathodes. [Promoters argue that because the plutonium removed from the salt in this manner contains some uranium, other transuranic elements and some fission product contamination, it is so impure that it would not be desirable for a terrorist seeking fissile material for a bomb, and would be so radioactive that it would be hard to steal anyway.] None of these claims has merit.
"Promoters argue that because the plutonium removed from the salt in this manner contains some uranium, other transuranic elements and some fission product contamination, it is so impure that it would not be desirable for a terrorist seeking fissile material for a bomb, and would be so radioactive that it would be hard to steal anyway."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Effectively safeguarding this plant would also be more difficult because it is harder to accurately measure and keep track of the fissile materials in the process. [For these reasons, it is unlikely that these plants would be any more proliferation-resistant than conventional reprocessing plants.] The claim that pyroprocessing can also reduce the quantity of nuclear waste is false.
"For these reasons, it is unlikely that these plants would be any more proliferation-resistant than conventional reprocessing plants."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Commerce in bomb-grade uranium is especially dangerous because of the relative ease with which it can be made into nuclear weapons. [Iraq had begun to divert its research-reactor uranium to bombmaking until interrupted by the Gulf War.] The brave new nuclear world that lies ahead is actually at a crossroads.
"Iraq had begun to divert its research-reactor uranium to bombmaking until interrupted by the Gulf War."
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Pursuing innovative and effective ways to achieve this goal and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons is the work of the Nuclear Control Institute. [For more details, see "The Plutonium Threat" and "The Uranium Threat."]
"For more details, see "The Plutonium Threat" and "The Uranium Threat.""
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Now that NRC is in a position to rectify these inadequacies, we hope that it will take full advantage of this opportunity and conduct a thorough assessment of the environmental liabilities of DOEs MOX program, as well as an honest comparison of the MOX approach and its alternatives. [In NCIs opinion, all available evidence clearly shows that the immobilization option is superior to MOX with respect to environmental impact, cost, programmatic risk and non-proliferation, and NCI is confident that NRCs own review will reach the same conclusion.] Comments The EIS must evaluate direct and indirect impacts for all the MOX fuel preparation alternatives that are currently being considered by DOE, not only the one reflected in the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) Construction Authorization Request (CAR).
"In NCIs opinion, all available evidence clearly shows that the immobilization option is superior to MOX with respect to environmental impact, cost, programmatic risk and non-proliferation, and NCI is confident that NRCs own review will reach the same conclusion."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: MOX, NCI
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Of particular concern to NCI are the calculations carried out to estimate the additional public health impact of severe accidents at nuclear power plants associated with changing from low-enriched uranium (LEU) to MOX fuel. [This is a serious shortcoming, because such accidents are important components of the life-cycle risk associated with DOEs MOX program.] Without this information, it is impossible to do a fair comparison of the environmental and public health impacts of the plutonium disposition alternatives.
"This is a serious shortcoming, because such accidents are important components of the life-cycle risk associated with DOEs MOX program."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: MOX
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: For more than a decade, NCI has helped build support in Congress and government agencies for completing the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program. [The program converts reactors from bomb-grade to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, ensuring virtually the same reactor performance without the proliferation risks.] LEU:
"The program converts reactors from bomb-grade to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, ensuring virtually the same reactor performance without the proliferation risks."
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: LEU
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: More HEU Exports to Canada Are Not Justified NCI Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve Sept. 13 NCI to NRC: HEU Exports to Canada Require Continued Scrutiny Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve August 30 NCI to NRC: HEU Exports Require Continued Oversight NCI Letter to Richard Meserve, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 4, 2002 NRC Chairman Richard Meserve's Reply to NCI May 6, 2002 NCI Warns German Chancellor Schroeder Of Risk Of Terrorism"At Bavarias FRM-II Reactor October 29, 2001 Schroeder NCI letter to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder October 29, 2001 Bavarian press release October 25, 2001 FRM II reactor NCI Calls for Halt in Exports of Bomb-Grade Fuel to Canada July 27, 2001 Letter to NRC Earlier documents Response from NRC August 15, 2001 NCI Files Petition With NRC [To Block Export Of Bomb-Grade Uranium June 27, 2001 NCI's Petition Declaration of NCI President Nuclear Control Institute Calls on Nuclear Industry to Abandon Use of Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium NCI Press Release, April 9, 2001 DOE Decision to "Melt and Dilute," Not Reprocess, Bomb-Grade Fuel is a Major Non-Proliferation Victory NCI Press Release, August 4, 2000 NCI to Vice President Gore: If Russia Insists on HEU Fuel, Core Conversion Program Should Be Cancelled NCI Letter to Vice President Al Gore, December 17, 1999] NCI Hails DOE's "Proliferation-Resistant" Plan for Disposing of Bomb-Grade Spent Fuel, But Secretary Richardson Needs to Guarantee Adequate Funding NCI Press Release, December 28, 1998 NCI, NGOs to Gore: US Should Not Help Russia Convert Reactors to Use HEU Fuel Letter from NCI and seven other public interest groups to Vice President Al Gore, November 19, 1998 NCI to Gore: US Should Not Help Russia Convert Reactor Cores to Use HEU Fuel Letter from NCI to Vice President Al Gore, November 3, 1998 Reply from Vice President Gore to NCI, April 19, 1999 NCI Criticizes German Non-Proposal; German Reactor Does Not Require Bomb-Grade Fuel, U.S. Insists NCI press release, January 19, 1996 Letter from NCI to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve Regarding Nordion Request for Export of Additional Highly Enriched Uranium to Canada (December 18, 2000)
"To Block Export Of Bomb-Grade Uranium June 27, 2001 NCI's Petition Declaration of NCI President Nuclear Control Institute Calls on Nuclear Industry to Abandon Use of Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium NCI Press Release, April 9, 2001 DOE Decision to "Melt and Dilute," Not Reprocess, Bomb-Grade Fuel is a Major Non-Proliferation Victory NCI Press Release, August 4, 2000 NCI to Vice President Gore: If Russia Insists on HEU Fuel, Core Conversion Program Should Be Cancelled NCI Letter to Vice President Al Gore, December 17, 1999"
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: Bomb-Grade Fuel, NCI, Nuclear Control Institute Calls on Nuclear Industry, HEU Fuel, Core Conversion Program Should Be
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Poses Risk of Catastrophic Accident NCI Press Release, March 27, 1998 English Text German Text NCI Urges Bavarian Environment Minister to Halt Work on FRM II NCI Letter, March 26, 1998 Declaration to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regarding Proposed Export of HEU to Canada Paul Leventhal, president, NCI, February 11, 1998 Petition of the Nuclear Control Institute for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing in the Matter of Proposed Export of HEU to Canada Eldon Greenberg, Counsel, NCI, December 29, 1997 RERTR End-Game: A Win-Win Framework Alan Kuperman, senior consultant, and Paul Leventhal, president, NCI Presented at the International Meeting on the RERTR Program, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, October 5-10, 1997 Civilian Uses of Bomb-Grade Uranium and the NNPT NCI Position Paper Prepared for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) Preparatory Committee Meeting (PrepComm), United Nations, New York, April 7, 1997 German Claims of American NPT Violation Debunked; Proposed German Reactor is Real Violator, says NCI Press Release, October 29, 1996 NCI Criticizes FRM-II Groundbreaking: "The Wrong Reactor at the Wrong Time" Press Release, August 1, 1996 [A Three-Nation Nuclear End Run Paul Leventhaland Alan Kuperman op-ed, New York Times, June 6, 1996, International Herald Tribune, June 8-9, 1996 O'Leary's Decision to Take Back Bomb-Grade Uranium is Major Victory Against Nuclear Terrorism Threat NCI press release, May 13, 1996 Bavaria's 'Rogue Elephant' Decision To Build Reactor with Bomb-Grade Uranium Sets Dangerous Precedent NCI press release, April 9, 1996 TUM Goes Loco Over Logo NCI Correspondence with TUM, April 1996 NCI to Secretary of State Christopher: Stop Russian-European Bomb-Grade Uranium Deal] Two letters from NCI to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, January 5 and February 22, 1996 , concerning negotiations between Russia and Euratom for supply of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel---and the implications for Germany's planned HEU-fueled reactor.
"A Three-Nation Nuclear End Run Paul Leventhaland Alan Kuperman op-ed, New York Times, June 6, 1996, International Herald Tribune, June 8-9, 1996 O'Leary's Decision to Take Back Bomb-Grade Uranium is Major Victory Against Nuclear Terrorism Threat NCI press release, May 13, 1996 Bavaria's 'Rogue Elephant' Decision To Build Reactor with Bomb-Grade Uranium Sets Dangerous Precedent NCI press release, April 9, 1996 TUM Goes Loco Over Logo NCI Correspondence with TUM, April 1996 NCI to Secretary of State Christopher: Stop Russian-European Bomb-Grade Uranium Deal"
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: State, NCI, Bomb-Grade Uranium Sets Dangerous Precedent, TUM, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Major Victory Against Nuclear Terrorism Threat NCI
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: c i a l S e c t [i o n s [ Getting Rid of Military Plutonium | Nuclear Terrorism Threat ]] [ Plutonium Air Shipments | Radioactive Sea Shipments ]
"i o n s [ Getting Rid of Military Plutonium | Nuclear Terrorism Threat ]"
Source: nci-wpu-maps.html
Title: Plutonium Disposition: USA Nuclear Power Plant Maps
Entities: Getting Rid of Military Plutonium
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: s [[ The Problem | The Plutonium Threat | The Uranium Threat | Join Campaign | News ]] [ Initiatives | Releases | Publications | Graphics | Write Us | NCI Staff | Hot Links ] ______________________________________________________
"[ The Problem | The Plutonium Threat | The Uranium Threat | Join Campaign | News ]"
Source: nci-wpu-maps.html
Title: Plutonium Disposition: USA Nuclear Power Plant Maps
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: With tons of atom-bomb materials in commerce, such explosions could become commonplace. [Beyond the immediate threat of nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism, there's a larger threat: nations that stockpile plutonium and bomb-grade uranium for peaceful purposes can convert these fuels into nuclear weapons at any time.] That's what Iraq did with its "peaceful" supply of bomb-grade uranium in 1990 until the Gulf War interrupted its crash bomb program.
"Beyond the immediate threat of nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism, there's a larger threat: nations that stockpile plutonium and bomb-grade uranium for peaceful purposes can convert these fuels into nuclear weapons at any time."
Source: poi.htm
Title: Plutonium on the Internet
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: New plants could not be brought on line fast enough to offset present electricity shortages and would do little to reduce greenhouse gas emission, two-thirds of which come from the transportation and other sectors. [Energy efficiency and alternative energy measures could be implemented to offset the need to build any new nuclear plants, thus avoiding reactor-safety and weapons-proliferation risks associated with nuclear power.] (See todays New York Times op-ed article at http://www.nci.org/oped.htm .)
"Energy efficiency and alternative energy measures could be implemented to offset the need to build any new nuclear plants, thus avoiding reactor-safety and weapons-proliferation risks associated with nuclear power."
Source: pr51701.htm
Title: 5/17/2001 NCI Press Release on Bush Energy Plan
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: 5/23/2001 NCI Comments to SMP Consultation May 23, 2001 Claire Herdman Radioactive Substances Division Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 4/F6 Ashedown House 123 Victoria Street London SW1E 6DE UNITED KINGDOM BY FACSIMILE 011 44 20 74944 6340 Nuclear Control Institute Comments for Sellafield Mixed-Oxide Fuel Plant (SMP) Consultation [The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), a non-proliferation research and advocacy center located in Washington, DC, USA, submits the following comments to the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) Consultation.] NCI believes that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) should not authorize hot testing of SMP with plutonium or other radioactive materials, nor should SMP be commissioned to manufacture MOX fuel.
"The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), a non-proliferation research and advocacy center located in Washington, DC, USA, submits the following comments to the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) Consultation."
Source: nci-smp52301.htm
Title: 5/23/2001 NCI Comments to SMP Consultation
Entities: NCI, the Sellafield MOX Plant, The Nuclear Control Institute
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: The only imperative for operating SMP is to get rid of plutonium that has been separated from spent fuel pursuant to reprocessing contracts that utilities entered into on the basis of the earlier false assumptions. [But given the far greater expense of MOX fuel relative to uranium fuel, as well as the undeniable proliferation and security risks associated with commerce in plutonium (see next section), the plutonium should be immobilized and disposed of directly as waste.] 2. MOX fuel poses a nuclear proliferation threat.
"But given the far greater expense of MOX fuel relative to uranium fuel, as well as the undeniable proliferation and security risks associated with commerce in plutonium (see next section), the plutonium should be immobilized and disposed of directly as waste."
Source: nci-smp52301.htm
Title: 5/23/2001 NCI Comments to SMP Consultation
Entities: MOX
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: An explosion or catastrophic failure at a civilian reactor handling separated MOX fuel would present an unacceptable public health catastrophe.
"It would be impossible to eliminate the risk that plutonium would be diverted or stolen by insiders."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: Nuclear Control Institute Testimony
Entities: None
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: The Bush administration has recently proposed expanding research into pyroprocessing. [But unfortunately, the program actually represents a step backward from the established U.S. policy discouraging civilian reprocessing and use of separated plutonium.]
"But unfortunately, the program actually represents a step backward from the established U.S. policy discouraging civilian reprocessing and use of separated plutonium."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: Testimony on ATW Program
Entities: None
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: The administration is attempting to justify the massive costs of the program. [This leaves no doubt that establishing the viability of commercial reprocessing was a major reason that the ATW program received funding from Congress.]
"This leaves no doubt that establishing the viability of commercial reprocessing was a major reason that the ATW program received funding from Congress."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: ATW Funding Warnings
Entities: Congress
Warning / Threat Assessment
Context: Transmutation technologies remain largely unproven. [If the goal of the ATW program is to simply make it appear that the government is doing something about the spent fuel problem, there is a risk that this will actually create a new proliferation vector.]
"If the goal of the ATW program is to simply make it appear that the government is doing something about the spent fuel problem, there is a risk that this will actually create a new proliferation vector."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: Proliferation Vectors
Entities: None
Warning / Core Message
"Nuclear Terrorism Threat: Could terrorists build a bomb with stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium?"
Source: about-nci.htm
Warning / Core Message
"Plutonium & Reprocessing: Getting Rid of Military Plutonium. Using plutonium from bombs as fuel for nuclear power reactors invites theft by terrorists and outlaw states."
Source: about-nci.htm
Warning / Core Message
"However, the debate over reprocessing and whether it really increases risk of spreading plutonium and proliferation is still ongoing."
Source: awards.htm
Warning / Core Message
"Is there an irreducible proliferation risk posed by plutonium production in reactors and by the prospect of cheap, efficient enrichment technology with virtually limitless sources of uranium?"
Source: conf-program.htm
Safeguards Vulnerability
"These safeguards are unlikely to be effective in adversarial situations in which state operators or plant employees seek to 'beat the system' and remove materials."
Source: nci_distilled_knowledge.txt
MOX Fuel Risks
"A nuclear reactor using MOX fuel contains greater quantities of plutonium and other hazardous actinides than one using only uranium fuel... releases of these additional actinides could cause hundreds to thousands of additional cancer deaths among the public."
Source: nci_distilled_knowledge.txt

Extracted Statistics & Measurements

Statistic / Measurement
Context: Visit our CAP page. ["Plutonium on the Internet" Poster Complete list of over 20 awards for this site with links to them.] We welcome your comments on its design and contents.
""Plutonium on the Internet" Poster Complete list of over 20 awards for this site with links to them."
Source: about-nci.htm
Title: Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), Washington D.C.
Statistic / Measurement
Context: You have my support. [I enclose $25, payable to the Nuclear Control Institute, for the international Campaign Against Plutonium.] I enclose an additional contribution of $ to help make CAP initiatives possible.
"I enclose $25, payable to the Nuclear Control Institute, for the international Campaign Against Plutonium."
Source: nci-cap.htm
Title: NCI - Campaign Against Plutonium
Entities: the Nuclear Control Institute
Statistic / Measurement
Context: [5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing RESEARCH ON ACCELERATOR TRANSMUTATION OF WASTE AND PYROPROCESSING IS A COLOSSAL WASTE OF TAXPAYER MONEY STATEMENT OF EDWIN S. LYMAN, PHD SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE MAY 24, 2001 Good morning.] I'm Edwin Lyman, scientific director of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), a nuclear non-proliferation research and advocacy organization.
"5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing RESEARCH ON ACCELERATOR TRANSMUTATION OF WASTE AND PYROPROCESSING IS A COLOSSAL WASTE OF TAXPAYER MONEY STATEMENT OF EDWIN S. LYMAN, PHD SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE MAY 24, 2001 Good morning."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: ATW
Statistic / Measurement
Context: The political reasons for this recommendation are pretty clear. [First, it was to make amends with influential members of Congress like Senator Domenici of New Mexico, an outspoken advocate of nuclear energy and reprocessing, who were upset by the Bush Administrations proposal in April to drastically reduce or even zero out funds for some of their favorite pork barrel projects, like the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) program at Los Alamos.] Bills introduced by Senators Domenici and Murkowski earlier this year contain provisions for establishing an Office of Spent Fuel Research to coordinate reprocessing technology development at DOE, and these bills no doubt provide a starting point for the legislative implementation of the Bush policy.
"First, it was to make amends with influential members of Congress like Senator Domenici of New Mexico, an outspoken advocate of nuclear energy and reprocessing, who were upset by the Bush Administrations proposal in April to drastically reduce or even zero out funds for some of their favorite pork barrel projects, like the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) program at Los Alamos."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste, ATW, Congress
Statistic / Measurement
Context: In 1999, DOE issued a report to Congress entitled "A Roadmap for Developing ATW Technology." [The report describes how a massive nationwide system of spent fuel reprocessing plants, accelerator-driven spallation neutron sources, liquid-metal cooled ATW target assemblies and pyrochemical ATW reprocessing plants --- could transmute the entire U.S. spent fuel inventory over a 118-year period for a cost of only $279 billion (1999 dollars).] The Bush energy policy does not make spell out who it thinks is going to pay to design, build and run these facilities for over a century --- not to mention protect and safeguard all the nuclear material processing and transport.
"The report describes how a massive nationwide system of spent fuel reprocessing plants, accelerator-driven spallation neutron sources, liquid-metal cooled ATW target assemblies and pyrochemical ATW reprocessing plants --- could transmute the entire U.S. spent fuel inventory over a 118-year period for a cost of only $279 billion (1999 dollars)."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: ATW
Statistic / Measurement
Context: And most important, how would a nationwide transmutation system be operated with the level of central planning necessary for such a complex system? [One of the basic facts of transmutation is that if the system were to fail before the job were complete, the actual reduction in plutonium that would have been achieved would be less than a factor of ten, and the project would be nothing more than a big waste of money and time.] There is only one plausible answer to this question.
"One of the basic facts of transmutation is that if the system were to fail before the job were complete, the actual reduction in plutonium that would have been achieved would be less than a factor of ten, and the project would be nothing more than a big waste of money and time."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Statistic / Measurement
Context: It is odd that the ATW roadmap would be embraced by free-market conservatives like Bush and Domenici, because it is really a plan for nationalization of the electricity industry. [Besides this, NCIs greatest concern is the proliferation risk associated with a plan that involves reprocessing at least 80,000 tons of spent fuel, containing at least 800 tons of plutonium, and then running the plutonium and other radioactive materials through the transmutation plants, reprocessing the spent targets and running the process over and over again.] The amount of plutonium that would be processed through such a system is truly staggering and would overwhelm the resources of DOE or whichever agency would be tasked with safeguarding and protecting this material.
"Besides this, NCIs greatest concern is the proliferation risk associated with a plan that involves reprocessing at least 80,000 tons of spent fuel, containing at least 800 tons of plutonium, and then running the plutonium and other radioactive materials through the transmutation plants, reprocessing the spent targets and running the process over and over again."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Pyroprocessing has also run into a lot of technical problems. [A three-year demonstration of the process failed to complete its goals of processing 125 spent fuel elements -- so that DOE was able to argue that the demonstration was successful only by changing the success criteria it had originally established!] The process is dirty and several serious incidents, including contamination of 11 personnel, occurred.
"A three-year demonstration of the process failed to complete its goals of processing 125 spent fuel elements -- so that DOE was able to argue that the demonstration was successful only by changing the success criteria it had originally established!"
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: DOE
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Nuclear power reactors were first built in the 1950s, and today they are found in over 30 countries. [Although the intended use of these two kinds of reactors is different, the problem is that they both produce plutonium, a byproduct of nuclear fission.] Civilian electrical power reactors are typically much larger than military production reactors and therefore produce many times more plutonium than military reactors.
"Although the intended use of these two kinds of reactors is different, the problem is that they both produce plutonium, a byproduct of nuclear fission."
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Statistic / Measurement
Context: International trade in HEU was started with little foresight in the 1950s, under the Atoms for Peace program. [Over the next three decades, the United States exported dozens of nuclear research reactors and tens of tons of HEU---the same material used in the Hiroshima bomb.] If stolen or diverted, a tiny fraction of this material---less than 50 pounds (25 kilograms) ---is sufficient to build a nuclear weapon.
"Over the next three decades, the United States exported dozens of nuclear research reactors and tens of tons of HEU---the same material used in the Hiroshima bomb."
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Entities: HEU
Statistic / Measurement
Context: The brave new nuclear world that lies ahead is actually at a crossroads. [One path leads to widespread use of plutonium and bomb-grade uranium as civilian fuels on the premise that they can be adequately protected against misuse for bombs by nations or by groups.] The other path leads to a ban on these fuels because 100% protection and permanent peaceful use cannot be guaranteed.
"One path leads to widespread use of plutonium and bomb-grade uranium as civilian fuels on the premise that they can be adequately protected against misuse for bombs by nations or by groups."
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Statistic / Measurement
Context: AP story, May 15, 1998, Washington Post website. [Pakistan starts up plutonium production reactor giving it capacity to produce two bombs a year, NCI President Leventhal tells House committee.] AP story, May 14, 1998, Washington Post website.
"Pakistan starts up plutonium production reactor giving it capacity to produce two bombs a year, NCI President Leventhal tells House committee."
Source: ind-pak2.htm
Title: India-Pakistan Nuclear Central
Entities: NCI, House
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Thus the scope of the NRC MFFF EIS will have to be greatly expanded beyond the narrow question of whether or not to issue a Construction Authorization based on the version of the CAR currently before NRC. [These programmatic changes include (1) the likely cancellation of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) and (2) the possible cancellation of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF).] DOE's previous plan was to construct both of these facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in accordance with the SPD FEIS ROD.
"These programmatic changes include (1) the likely cancellation of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) and (2) the possible cancellation of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF)."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: Conversion Facility, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, the Pit Disassembly, PDCF
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Since only four reactors at two sites (Catawba and McGuire) are currently willing to use MOX, the maximum amount of plutonium that can be absorbed per year according to the current plan is about 1.8 MT. [Under the September 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement, both parties are committed to implementing a program capable of disposing of 2 MT/yr by 2008, and ramping up to a 4 MT/yr program as soon as practicable.] Clearly, the transfer of additional plutonium to the MOX track will increase the environmental impacts from reactor irradiation, by increasing the plutonium loading per reactor, the irradiation time or the number of program reactors.
"Under the September 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement, both parties are committed to implementing a program capable of disposing of 2 MT/yr by 2008, and ramping up to a 4 MT/yr program as soon as practicable."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Sincerely, Edwin S. Lyman, PhD Scientific Director [[1] For example, see Edwin S. Lyman, "Nuclear Control Institute Comments on the Department of Energy's Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement," June 28, 1999.] Web: www.nci.org/e/el62899.htm [2] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Review of the U.S. Department of Energy Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, letter to Peter Hastings, DCS, from Melanie A. Galloway, NMSS, May 3, 2000, Enclosure 1, p.4.
"[1] For example, see Edwin S. Lyman, "Nuclear Control Institute Comments on the Department of Energy's Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement," June 28, 1999."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: the Department of Energy's Supplement, Nuclear Control Institute Comments, the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement
Statistic / Measurement
Context: [1] For example, see Edwin S. Lyman, "Nuclear Control Institute Comments on the Department of Energy's Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement," June 28, 1999. [Web: www.nci.org/e/el62899.htm [2] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Review of the U.S. Department of Energy Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, letter to Peter Hastings, DCS, from Melanie A. Galloway, NMSS, May 3, 2000, Enclosure 1, p.4.] [3] Ibid, p.5.
"Web: www.nci.org/e/el62899.htm [2] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Review of the U.S. Department of Energy Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, letter to Peter Hastings, DCS, from Melanie A. Galloway, NMSS, May 3, 2000, Enclosure 1, p.4."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: DCS, NMSS, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Review, the U.S. Department of Energy Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement
Statistic / Measurement
Context: According to Manhattan Project physicist Luis Alvarez, Commerce in HEU is especially dangerous. [With modern weapons-grade uranium...terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half....] Even a high school student could make a bomb in short order.
"With modern weapons-grade uranium...terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half...."
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Statistic / Measurement
Context: A Three-Nation Nuclear End Run Paul Leventhaland Alan Kuperman op-ed, New York Times, June 6, 1996, International Herald Tribune, June 8-9, 1996 O'Leary's Decision to Take Back Bomb-Grade Uranium is Major Victory Against Nuclear Terrorism Threat NCI press release, May 13, 1996 Bavaria's 'Rogue Elephant' Decision To Build Reactor with Bomb-Grade Uranium Sets Dangerous Precedent NCI press release, April 9, 1996 TUM Goes Loco Over Logo NCI Correspondence with TUM, April 1996 NCI to Secretary of State Christopher: Stop Russian-European Bomb-Grade Uranium Deal [Two letters from NCI to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, January 5 and February 22, 1996 , concerning negotiations between Russia and Euratom for supply of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel---and the implications for Germany's planned HEU-fueled reactor.] State Department response from Assistant Secretary of State Thomas E. McNamara, February 9, 1996 "German's HEU Decision at Garching: Impact on World Commerce in Bomb-Grade Uranium" Testimony by Paul Leventhal presented to Hearing of Green Party on the Garching 2 Research Reactor, Bonn, Germany, November 1, 1995 "German's HEU Decision at Garching: Impact on World Commerce in Bomb-Grade Uranium" Testimony by Paul Leventhal presented to Hearing of Green Party on the Garching 2 Research Reactor, Bonn, Germany, November 1, 1995 "RERTR at the Crossroads: Success or Demise" paper by Paul Leventhal and Alan Kuperman presented to the International RERTR Conference, Paris, France, September 18, 1995 <p> Updated:
"Two letters from NCI to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, January 5 and February 22, 1996 , concerning negotiations between Russia and Euratom for supply of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel---and the implications for Germany's planned HEU-fueled reactor."
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: NCI, State, HEU
Statistic / Measurement
Context: [Plutonium Disposition: USA Nuclear Power Plant Maps Sep OCT MAY 12 1998 1999 2000 92 captures 12 Oct 99 - 29] Dec 15 Close Help U. S. P L U T O N
"Plutonium Disposition: USA Nuclear Power Plant Maps Sep OCT MAY 12 1998 1999 2000 92 captures 12 Oct 99 - 29"
Source: nci-wpu-maps.html
Title: Plutonium Disposition: USA Nuclear Power Plant Maps
Statistic / Measurement
Context: [Plutonium Shipments Maps World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes (click on map above to see a bigger version ; this map, along with its table, is available in Microsoft Word format for quality print-out) Original Air Shipment Route (~ 13000 km) :] France, Canada, landing in Anchorage, Alaska for refueling, Anchorage to Japan.
"Plutonium Shipments Maps World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes (click on map above to see a bigger version ; this map, along with its table, is available in Microsoft Word format for quality print-out) Original Air Shipment Route (~ 13000 km) :"
Source: nci-wm.htm
Title: Plutonium Shipments Maps
Entities: Plutonium Air Shipment Routes, Microsoft, Original Air Shipment Route
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Route not used to date . [All maps are available in Microsoft Word format: (for quality print-outs) - World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes file name: pas-wm.zip (file size: 440 kb) - Europe Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes file name: pas-em.zip (file size: 280 kb) -] Britain/France to Japan trans-Russia map file name: pas-ejm.zip (file size: 175 kb) Go to: Plutonium Air Shipments page What's New page home page NCI introduction page 1996 Nuclear Control Institute .
"All maps are available in Microsoft Word format: (for quality print-outs) - World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes file name: pas-wm.zip (file size: 440 kb) - Europe Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes file name: pas-em.zip (file size: 280 kb) -"
Source: nci-wm.htm
Title: Plutonium Shipments Maps
Entities: Plutonium Air Shipment Routes, Microsoft
Statistic / Measurement
Context: All maps are available in Microsoft Word format: (for quality print-outs) - World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes file name: pas-wm.zip (file size: 440 kb) - Europe Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes file name: pas-em.zip (file size: 280 kb) - [Britain/France to Japan trans-Russia map file name: pas-ejm.zip (file size: 175 kb) Go to: Plutonium Air Shipments page What's New page home page NCI introduction page 1996 Nuclear Control Institute .] 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 804 Washington, DC, 20036, U.S.A. Telephone: 202-822-8444, Fax: 202-452-0892 E-mail: mail@nci.org
"Britain/France to Japan trans-Russia map file name: pas-ejm.zip (file size: 175 kb) Go to: Plutonium Air Shipments page What's New page home page NCI introduction page 1996 Nuclear Control Institute ."
Source: nci-wm.htm
Title: Plutonium Shipments Maps
Entities: NCI, Nuclear Control Institute
Statistic / Measurement
Context: The nuclear industry's safety and security claims are often misleading. [Its spokesmen still insist that the Three Mile Island accident demonstrated that the core of a light water reactor is far more resistant to a meltdown than had been previously thought.] They don't acknowledge that the core at the Three Mile Island plant was within hours of an uncontrolled melt with Chernobyl-like consequences when a new shift supervisor came on duty in a panicked control room and finally figured out that thousands of gallons of cooling water had poured undetected from a valve that was stuck open.
"Its spokesmen still insist that the Three Mile Island accident demonstrated that the core of a light water reactor is far more resistant to a meltdown than had been previously thought."
Source: oped.htm
Title: More Nuclear Power Means More Risk
Statistic / Measurement
Context: There have been at least eight such shutdowns over the past 16 months, according to an analysis of N.R.C. data by the Union of Concerned Scientists. [And the agency has decided not to take enforcement action against weak security at nuclear plants: guards at half the nation's nuclear power plants have failed to repel mock attackers in N.R.C.-supervised exercises that test the protection of reactor safety systems against sabotage.] Instead, it is in the process of weakening the rules of the "game" used in the mock attacks.
"And the agency has decided not to take enforcement action against weak security at nuclear plants: guards at half the nation's nuclear power plants have failed to repel mock attackers in N.R.C.-supervised exercises that test the protection of reactor safety systems against sabotage."
Source: oped.htm
Title: More Nuclear Power Means More Risk
Statistic / Measurement
Context: And worldwide, it would take 3,000 nuclear plants a tenfold increase to replace all coal plants; yet that increase would reduce carbon emissions by only 20 percent, while enormously expanding risks that materials from nuclear power plants would be applied to making weapons. [And since reserves of uranium ore are limited, millions of kilograms of plutonium, equivalent to hundreds of thousands of bombs, would have to be separated from wastes each year to help fuel so many reactors in the future.] There are better alternatives.
"And since reserves of uranium ore are limited, millions of kilograms of plutonium, equivalent to hundreds of thousands of bombs, would have to be separated from wastes each year to help fuel so many reactors in the future."
Source: oped.htm
Title: More Nuclear Power Means More Risk
Statistic / Measurement
Context: The costs of commercial MOX fuel fabrication have spiraled. [The U.S. currently faces a bill of at least $4 billion to dispose of a mere 34 metric tons of plutonium taken from dismantled nuclear warheads.]
"The U.S. currently faces a bill of at least $4 billion to dispose of a mere 34 metric tons of plutonium taken from dismantled nuclear warheads."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: Disposition Costs
Entities: None
Statistic / Measurement
Context: The cancellation of the PIP facility has created a severe bottleneck. [The cancellation of the PIP would require redesign of the MFFF to accommodate up to 16 metric tons (MT) of excess plutonium in impure forms now slated for immobilization.]
"The cancellation of the PIP would require redesign of the MFFF to accommodate up to 16 metric tons (MT) of excess plutonium in impure forms now slated for immobilization."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: PIP Cancellation Impacts
Entities: MFFF, PIP
Statistic / Measurement
Context: The logistics of absorbing this material into the commercial sector are unworkable. [Since only four reactors at two sites (Catawba and McGuire) are currently willing to use MOX, the maximum amount of plutonium that can be absorbed per year according to the current plan is about 1.8 MT.]
"Since only four reactors at two sites (Catawba and McGuire) are currently willing to use MOX, the maximum amount of plutonium that can be absorbed per year according to the current plan is about 1.8 MT."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: Reactor Absorption Rates
Entities: Catawba, McGuire
Statistic / Measurement
Context: Over the past fifty years, the accumulation has become staggering. [Like Dr. Makhijanis organization, IEER, NCI is greatly concerned about the accumulation of stockpiles of hundreds of tons of weapon-usable plutonium that is occurring in nations that reprocess spent nuclear fuel like the U.K. and France.]
"Like Dr. Makhijanis organization, IEER, NCI is greatly concerned about the accumulation of stockpiles of hundreds of tons of weapon-usable plutonium that is occurring in nations that reprocess spent nuclear fuel like the U.K. and France."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: Global Stockpiles
Entities: IEER, NCI
New Statistic
"More than 50 of these reactors run on highly enriched uranium, the same type of uranium used in the Hiroshima atomic bomb."
Source: nci-ura.htm
New Statistic
"Many dozens of the 200 or so research reactors operating in 59 countries have enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) to build at least one nuclear weapon."
Source: nci-ura.htm
Economic Failure of Plutonium
"Plutonium-based fuel costs four to eight times more than abundant, non-weapons-usable, low-enriched uranium."
Source: nci_distilled_knowledge.txt
Heavy Water Loss
"Dhruva had lost 1.43 tons of heavy water, a precious material for India because its paucity has slowed down its atomic expansion program."
Source: nci_distilled_knowledge.txt

Historical Context & Timelines

Historical Context
Context: 4:10 paper Response: Paul Leventhal. [4:25 paper Roundtable discussion: Bertram Wolfe, past Vice-President/Nuclear, General Electric Co.; past president, American Nuclear Society Harold Feiveson, Senior Research Policy Scientist, Princeton University William Lanouette, U.S. General Accounting Office; author, "Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, The Man Behind the Bomb" 4:45 Discussion and Closing Remarks 5:15 Adjourn 5:30-7:30 Reception Return to Conference Page]
"4:25 paper Roundtable discussion: Bertram Wolfe, past Vice-President/Nuclear, General Electric Co.; past president, American Nuclear Society Harold Feiveson, Senior Research Policy Scientist, Princeton University William Lanouette, U.S. General Accounting Office; author, "Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, The Man Behind the Bomb" 4:45 Discussion and Closing Remarks 5:15 Adjourn 5:30-7:30 Reception Return to Conference Page"
Source: conf-program.htm
Title: NCI Conference Program
Entities: General Electric Co., U.S. General Accounting Office, 4:25, Princeton University, American Nuclear Society
Historical Context
Context: 4:10 Response: Paul Leventhal. [4:25 Roundtable discussion: Bertram Wolfe, past Vice-President/Nuclear, General Electric Co.; past president, American Nuclear Society Harold Feiveson, Senior Research Policy Scientist, Princeton University William Lanouette, U.S. General Accounting Office; Author of "Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, The Man Behind the Bomb" 4:45 Discussion and Closing Remarks 5:15 Adjourn 5:30-7:30 Reception Return to Conference Page]
"4:25 Roundtable discussion: Bertram Wolfe, past Vice-President/Nuclear, General Electric Co.; past president, American Nuclear Society Harold Feiveson, Senior Research Policy Scientist, Princeton University William Lanouette, U.S. General Accounting Office; Author of "Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, The Man Behind the Bomb" 4:45 Discussion and Closing Remarks 5:15 Adjourn 5:30-7:30 Reception Return to Conference Page"
Source: conf-program2.htm
Title: NCI Conference Program
Entities: General Electric Co., U.S. General Accounting Office, 4:25 Roundtable, Princeton University, American Nuclear Society
Historical Context
Context: Mr. Clements joined NCI in February 1999, and is responsible for day-to-day management of the Institute's activities, reporting directly to Mr. Leventhal. [Mr. Clements was a senior nuclear campaigner at Greenpeace International and played a key role in that organization's opposition to commercial uses of plutonium, bomb-grade uranium and weapons-related nuclear technology since 1989.] An eighth-generation Georgian, Mr. Clements holds bachelors and masters degrees from Emory University and the University of Georgia, respectively.
"Mr. Clements was a senior nuclear campaigner at Greenpeace International and played a key role in that organization's opposition to commercial uses of plutonium, bomb-grade uranium and weapons-related nuclear technology since 1989."
Source: bio.htm
Title: Our Professional Staff
Entities: Greenpeace International
Historical Context
Context: Previously, he was legislative director for Congressman Charles Schumer and administrative assistant to Congressman James Scheuer. [In 1987, as the Institute's issues director, he co-authored an NCI report that disclosed plans to proceed with air shipment of plutonium to Japan in the absence of a crashproof shipment cask.] He is a graduate of Harvard College, and is currently a fellow at the Brookings Institution.
"In 1987, as the Institute's issues director, he co-authored an NCI report that disclosed plans to proceed with air shipment of plutonium to Japan in the absence of a crashproof shipment cask."
Source: bio.htm
Title: Our Professional Staff
Entities: Institute, NCI
Historical Context
Context: [Plutonium Air Shipments Plutonium Air Shipments World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes (check out countries that are overflown or are close to the flightpaths) Overview In 1987, the Nuclear Control Institute disclosed that air shipments of extremely toxic plutonium were about to begin from Europe to Japan via Alaska even though industry had failed to develop a shipping cask capable of withstanding a high-velocity crash.] The result of our groundbreaking report: Congress enacted a law barring such shipments, Japan was forced to switch to sea transports of plutonium from Europe, German state licensing authorities blocked air shipments of plutonium fuel to Britain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began a process to establish stricter international standards for shipping plutonium by air.
"Plutonium Air Shipments Plutonium Air Shipments World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes (check out countries that are overflown or are close to the flightpaths) Overview In 1987, the Nuclear Control Institute disclosed that air shipments of extremely toxic plutonium were about to begin from Europe to Japan via Alaska even though industry had failed to develop a shipping cask capable of withstanding a high-velocity crash."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: Plutonium Air Shipment Routes, Plutonium Air Shipments Plutonium Air Shipments World Map of, the Nuclear Control Institute
Historical Context
Context: May 16 U.S. India-Pakistan Mission Fails to Ease the Standoff New York Times May 15 Report: India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War in '99 Washington Post [May 12 U.S. Envoy on Mission to India and Pakistan New York Times Pak had plans to nuke India in 1999 Express India May 10 The Kashmir Time Bomb] [op-ed] Washington Post April 27 India's multi-ethnicity danger to its nukes: report PakNews Russian company begins work on Indian N-plant Interfax (Russia) April 26 India Planning Nuclear Weapons Command Structure Reuters April 8
"May 12 U.S. Envoy on Mission to India and Pakistan New York Times Pak had plans to nuke India in 1999 Express India May 10 The Kashmir Time Bomb"
Source: ind-pak-news.htm
Title: India-Pakistan Nuclear Central
Entities: The Kashmir Time Bomb, New York Times Pak
Historical Context
Context: January 12 Nuclear War an Option, India Says National Post Indian General Talks Bluntly of War and a Nuclear Threat New York Times January 11 Malaysia fears nuclear threat in India-Pakistan tension AFP January 7 India Pledges [No First Nuclear Strike BBC "Atoms for Peace" Allowed India's A-Bomb [letter] Washington Times January 5 Pakistan not to use nukes in war: Moin PakNews (Pakistan) January 3 Nuclear war possible: Wasim Sajjad PakNews (Pakistan)] January 2 US Urges Nuke-Armed Rivals to Cool It Las Vegas SUN
"No First Nuclear Strike BBC "Atoms for Peace" Allowed India's A-Bomb [letter] Washington Times January 5 Pakistan not to use nukes in war: Moin PakNews (Pakistan) January 3 Nuclear war possible: Wasim Sajjad PakNews (Pakistan)"
Source: ind-pak-news.htm
Title: India-Pakistan Nuclear Central
Entities: Washington Times, A-Bomb
Historical Context
Context: First, it was to make amends with influential members of Congress like Senator Domenici of New Mexico, an outspoken advocate of nuclear energy and reprocessing, who were upset by the Bush Administrations proposal in April to drastically reduce or even zero out funds for some of their favorite pork barrel projects, like the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) program at Los Alamos. [Bills introduced by Senators Domenici and Murkowski earlier this year contain provisions for establishing an Office of Spent Fuel Research to coordinate reprocessing technology development at DOE, and these bills no doubt provide a starting point for the legislative implementation of the Bush policy.] Second, the energy policy had to contain a bone to throw to certain Nevada politicians who were concerned about a Bush policy that proposed new construction of nuclear power plants but didnt offer any alternative other than the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for the waste they would create.
"Bills introduced by Senators Domenici and Murkowski earlier this year contain provisions for establishing an Office of Spent Fuel Research to coordinate reprocessing technology development at DOE, and these bills no doubt provide a starting point for the legislative implementation of the Bush policy."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: an Office of Spent Fuel Research, DOE
Historical Context
Context: Like ATW, it sounds good at first, but the reality falls far short of these claims. [Pyroprocessing was originally developed for reprocessing metallic spent fuel from the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), a plutonium breeder reactor program that was cancelled in 1994.] Since then, the program has been kept alive as a pork-barrel program by supporters of Argonne National Laboratory, and is being used to reprocess spent fuel left over from the now-shutdown Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II).
"Pyroprocessing was originally developed for reprocessing metallic spent fuel from the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), a plutonium breeder reactor program that was cancelled in 1994."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR
Historical Context
Context: The process is still apparently experiencing problems --- The Bush administration budget provided funding only to support operation at a rate of 0.5 tons of fuel per year --- one-tenth of the rate at which it is supposed to be operating. [At this rate, it will take more than 50 years to process an amount of EBR-II spent fuel which was supposed to take only 5 years.] According to ANL, it could only achieve the original rate by running it 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and making unspecified "process improvements" which will cost more money.
"At this rate, it will take more than 50 years to process an amount of EBR-II spent fuel which was supposed to take only 5 years."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Historical Context
Context: But ahead of us there is a brave new nuclear world whose awesome dimensions are just coming into view. [The 21 ST century marks a turning point when more atom-bomb material enters civilian commerce than exists in all of the world's nuclear weapons.] The material is plutonium, a manmade element that is an essential ingredient of nuclear weapons.
"The 21 ST century marks a turning point when more atom-bomb material enters civilian commerce than exists in all of the world's nuclear weapons."
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Historical Context
Context: A further problem is the continuing use of bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) in research reactors on university campuses and in research institutes, where security is typically relaxed. [International trade in HEU was started with little foresight in the 1950s, under the Atoms for Peace program.] Over the next three decades, the United States exported dozens of nuclear research reactors and tens of tons of HEU---the same material used in the Hiroshima bomb.
"International trade in HEU was started with little foresight in the 1950s, under the Atoms for Peace program."
Source: nci-pro.htm
Title: www.NCI.org
Entities: HEU
Historical Context
Context: [Nuclear Shipments Maps World Map of Nuclear Sea Shipment Routes Sea shipment route via Panama Canal, to be used for 1998 waste shipment.] Also used in 1984 for first plutonium shipment.
"Nuclear Shipments Maps World Map of Nuclear Sea Shipment Routes Sea shipment route via Panama Canal, to be used for 1998 waste shipment."
Source: nci-wm-sea.htm
Title: Nuclear Shipments Maps
Historical Context
Context: Distance: 12,156 nautical miles (19,563 km). [Sea shipment route via Cape of Good Hope, used for the 1997 nuclear waste shipment from France to Japan.] Also used in 1992 for plutonium shipment (ship avoided Strait of Malacca in response to protests from Indonesia and Malaysia [route shown with dotted line] and went between Australia and New Zealand instead [solid line]).
"Sea shipment route via Cape of Good Hope, used for the 1997 nuclear waste shipment from France to Japan."
Source: nci-wm-sea.htm
Title: Nuclear Shipments Maps
Historical Context
Context: Sea shipment route via Cape of Good Hope, used for the 1997 nuclear waste shipment from France to Japan. [Also used in 1992 for plutonium shipment (ship avoided Strait of Malacca in response to protests from Indonesia and Malaysia [route shown with dotted line] and went between Australia and New Zealand instead [solid line]).] Distance: 14,248 nautical miles (22,929 km).
"Also used in 1992 for plutonium shipment (ship avoided Strait of Malacca in response to protests from Indonesia and Malaysia [route shown with dotted line] and went between Australia and New Zealand instead [solid line])."
Source: nci-wm-sea.htm
Title: Nuclear Shipments Maps
Entities: Strait of Malacca
Historical Context
Context: Distance: 14,248 nautical miles (22,929 km). [Sea shipment route used in 1995 to ship waste around Cape Horn.] Distance: 16,661 nautical miles (26,813 km).
"Sea shipment route used in 1995 to ship waste around Cape Horn."
Source: nci-wm-sea.htm
Title: Nuclear Shipments Maps
Historical Context
Context: [5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF Nuclear Control Institute Comments on the Scope and CONTENT of the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Edwin S. Lyman, PhD Scientific Director May 21, 2001 Introduction The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the scope and content of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF).] NCI has closely monitored the plutonium disposition program of the Department of Energy (DOE) since its inception, and has commented extensively on the inadequacies of DOEs own National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation for the program.
"5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF Nuclear Control Institute Comments on the Scope and CONTENT of the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Edwin S. Lyman, PhD Scientific Director May 21, 2001 Introduction The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the scope and content of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF)."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, PhD Scientific, Introduction The Nuclear Control Institute, NCI, MOX FFF Nuclear Control Institute Comments, NRC
Historical Context
Context: Since the spectrum of alternatives will not be known until the completion of a National Security Council (NSC) review on fissile material disposition policy and a DOE technical review of excess plutonium processing options, closure of the scoping process should be delayed until these reviews are publicly available. [DOEs plutonium disposition program is in a state of flux and is rapidly moving away from the preferred alternative identified in the 1999 DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final EIS (SPD FEIS) and confirmed by the subsequent Record of Decision (ROD).] Programmatic decisions that have occurred since the CAR was submitted in February of this year --- precipitated by a dramatic and alarming cost escalation of the MOX project --- may result in major changes to the MFFF design basis as described in the CAR.
"DOEs plutonium disposition program is in a state of flux and is rapidly moving away from the preferred alternative identified in the 1999 DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final EIS (SPD FEIS) and confirmed by the subsequent Record of Decision (ROD)."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final
Historical Context
Context: DOEs plutonium disposition program is in a state of flux and is rapidly moving away from the preferred alternative identified in the 1999 DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final EIS (SPD FEIS) and confirmed by the subsequent Record of Decision (ROD). [Programmatic decisions that have occurred since the CAR was submitted in February of this year --- precipitated by a dramatic and alarming cost escalation of the MOX project --- may result in major changes to the MFFF design basis as described in the CAR.] DOE is currently reviewing the entire technical basis of the SPD FEIS ROD.
"Programmatic decisions that have occurred since the CAR was submitted in February of this year --- precipitated by a dramatic and alarming cost escalation of the MOX project --- may result in major changes to the MFFF design basis as described in the CAR."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: MOX, MFFF, CAR
Historical Context
Context: NRC has only just begun its research program to address these issues. [Moreover, some issues may not be resolved until the completion of severe accident testing of high-burnup MOX lead test assemblies from the McGuire plant, which will not be available until at least 2006.] Therefore, NRC must acknowledge that any results of severe accident analysis obtained at this point for the purposes of this EIS have large uncertainties and are conditional on future resolution of these issues.
"Moreover, some issues may not be resolved until the completion of severe accident testing of high-burnup MOX lead test assemblies from the McGuire plant, which will not be available until at least 2006."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: MOX
Historical Context
Context: Even a student could make a bomb. [International trade in HEU was started with little foresight in the 1950s, under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program.] Over the next three decades, the United States exported dozens of nuclear research reactors and tens of tons of HEU---the same material used in the Hiroshima bomb.
"International trade in HEU was started with little foresight in the 1950s, under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program."
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: HEU
Historical Context
Context: Good performance without risks. [NCI helped win enactment of a law in 1992 that prohibits U.S. exports of HEU to reactors not cooperating fully with the RERTR program.] Our Institute also intervened before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to block HEU exports to reactors, such as the European Community's Petten reactor in the Netherlands, that could convert to LEU fuel but refuses to do so.
"NCI helped win enactment of a law in 1992 that prohibits U.S. exports of HEU to reactors not cooperating fully with the RERTR program."
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: RERTR, NCI, HEU
Historical Context
Context: NCI is also working to oppose the use of HEU fuel in the German FRM-II reactor, now under construction near Munich. [As the first large HEU-fueled research reactor (outside of China and Libya) built in 20 years, FRM-II would seriously undermine the RERTR Program's efforts to end HEU commerce.] NCI efforts to stop trade in HEU fuel.
"As the first large HEU-fueled research reactor (outside of China and Libya) built in 20 years, FRM-II would seriously undermine the RERTR Program's efforts to end HEU commerce."
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: FRM-II, HEU
Historical Context
Context: "First, Do No Harm": House Energy Bill's Medical Loophole Eases Exports of Bomb-Grade Uranium NCI Press Release (April 1, 2003) [U.S. HEU-Fueled Research Reactors Need Greater Security and Expedited Conversion, Not Russian HEU Imports (PDF) Paper by NCI President Dr. Edwin Lyman and Senior Policy Analyst Dr. Alan Kuperman, presented at the 24th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) in Bariloche, Argentina (Nov. 5, 2002)] More HEU Exports to Canada Are Not Justified NCI Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve Sept. 13 NCI to NRC: HEU Exports to Canada Require Continued Scrutiny Letter to NRC Chairman Richard Meserve August 30 NCI to NRC: HEU Exports Require Continued Oversight NCI Letter to Richard Meserve, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 4, 2002 NRC Chairman Richard Meserve's Reply to NCI May 6, 2002 NCI Warns German Chancellor Schroeder Of Risk Of Terrorism"At Bavarias FRM-II Reactor October 29, 2001 Schroeder NCI letter to German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder October 29, 2001 Bavarian press release October 25, 2001 FRM II reactor NCI Calls for Halt in Exports of Bomb-Grade Fuel to Canada July 27, 2001 Letter to NRC Earlier documents Response from NRC August 15, 2001 NCI Files Petition With NRC
"U.S. HEU-Fueled Research Reactors Need Greater Security and Expedited Conversion, Not Russian HEU Imports (PDF) Paper by NCI President Dr. Edwin Lyman and Senior Policy Analyst Dr. Alan Kuperman, presented at the 24th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) in Bariloche, Argentina (Nov. 5, 2002)"
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: NCI, PDF, U.S. HEU-Fueled Research Reactors Need Greater Security
Historical Context
Context: Forging Consensus to Phase Out HEU for Medical Isotope Production: A Proposed Path Forward Alan Kuperman, NCI Senior Consultant, and Paul Leventhal, NCI President, Presented to Panel on Converting Medical Isotope Production, RERTR-2000, 23rd International Conference on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 2, 2000 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Imposes Strict Conditions on Export of Bomb-Grade Fuel to European Community Reactor NCI Press Release, September 5, 2000 US NRC Must Continue Close Scrutiny of HEU Exports Statement of NCI President Paul Leventhal and NCI Senior Policy Consultant Alan Kuperman , presented to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Briefing on Proposed Export of High Enriched Uranium to Canada , July 10, 2000 Transcript of NRC Briefing on Proposed Export of Highly Enriched Uranium to Canada, July 10, 2000 NCI Correspondence Re: HEU Exports to Canada NCI Letter to Richard Meserve, US NRC Chairman, May 9, 2000 NCI Letter to Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), May 3, 2000 NCI Letter to Richard Meserve, US NRC Chairman, December 17, 1999 Chairman Meserve's Reply to NCI, January 27, 2000 DOE's Decision to Dispose of Bomb-Grade Spent Fuel Hailed as a Major Non-Proliferation Victory NCI-NRDC Press Release, April 11, 2000 Russian Core Conversion: Halting Russian Military Plutonium Production (new section) [German Federal Government Soon to Determine Fate of Proposed FRM II Research Reactor NCI Issue Update, February 4, 2000 A Level-Playing Field for Medical Isotope Production -- How to Phase Out Reliance on HEU Alan Kuperman, NCI senior policy analyst, Paper Presented at the the 22nd Annual International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), Budapest, Hungary, October 1999] Fixing a Bad Deal with Russia Alan Kuperman, NCI senior policy analyst, Boston Globe, July 22, 1999 NRC Sets Strict Conditions on Exports of Bomb-Grade Uranium to Canada NCI Press Release, June 29, 1999 NRC Memorandum and Order, June 29, 1999 Letter from Department of Energy to NCI on HEU Exports to Canada Letter from Leonard Spector, Director, DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, to NCI, June 28, 1999 NCI, Groups to DOE: Develop Non-Reprocessing Alternative Technologies to Dispose of Research Reactor Fuel Letter from NCI and 3 other NGOs to Energy Secretary Richardson, June 24, 1999 Statement of Paul L. Leventhal and Alan J. Kuperman, on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute, on the proposed export of highly enriched uranium to Canada Presented to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 16, 1999 NRC Holds Up Shipment of Bomb-Grade Uranium to Canada; Public Meeting on June 16 Will Examine if Proposed Export Violates US Law NCI Press Advisory, June 14, 1999 NCI to Secretaries: HEU Export to Canada Jeopardizes RERTR, Schumer Amendment Letter from Alan Kuperman, Senior Policy Analyst, and Paul Leventhal, President, to the Secretaries of Energy, State and Defense, February 19, 1999 Petition of the Nuclear Control Institute for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing (re: proposed export of 130.65 kg of highly enriched uranium to Canada)
"German Federal Government Soon to Determine Fate of Proposed FRM II Research Reactor NCI Issue Update, February 4, 2000 A Level-Playing Field for Medical Isotope Production -- How to Phase Out Reliance on HEU Alan Kuperman, NCI senior policy analyst, Paper Presented at the the 22nd Annual International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), Budapest, Hungary, October 1999"
Source: heu.htm
Title: NCI --- Bomb Grade Uranium
Entities: NCI, NCI Issue Update, German Federal Government, HEU Alan Kuperman
Historical Context
Context: The investigation proved highly critical of the industry's preparedness. [The result was a package of lessons-learned reforms enacted by Congress in 1980 to improve reactor safety and ensure emergency evacuations.] He also directed the Senate's investigation of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident.
"The result was a package of lessons-learned reforms enacted by Congress in 1980 to improve reactor safety and ensure emergency evacuations."
Source: aboutus.htm
Title: About the Nuclear Control Institute
Entities: Congress
Historical Context
Context: The organization was built on a singular non-proliferation mission. [For the past two decades, the Nuclear Control Institute has been dedicated to de-linking nuclear power and nuclear weapons by seeking a halt in commerce in plutonium and bomb-grade uranium.]
"For the past two decades, the Nuclear Control Institute has been dedicated to de-linking nuclear power and nuclear weapons by seeking a halt in commerce in plutonium and bomb-grade uranium."
Source: conf-purpose.htm
Title: NCI Purpose and Mission
Entities: Nuclear Control Institute
Historical Context
Context: The dangers of transporting weapons-grade materials by air cannot be overstated. [In 1987, the Nuclear Control Institute disclosed that air shipments of extremely toxic plutonium were about to begin from Europe to Japan via Alaska even though industry had failed to develop a shipping cask capable of withstanding a high-velocity crash.]
"In 1987, the Nuclear Control Institute disclosed that air shipments of extremely toxic plutonium were about to begin from Europe to Japan via Alaska even though industry had failed to develop a shipping cask capable of withstanding a high-velocity crash."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: Nuclear Control Institute
Archival History
"NCI Response to Palfreman Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley June 19, 1997 Eight National Public-Interest Groups Object to 'Frontline' Nuclear Power Documentary as 'Biased' and 'Inaccurate' Press Release, April 1, 1997"
Source: nci-frontline.htm
Archival History
"By the late 1970's, more than 150 research reactors worldwide used highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel."
Source: nci-ura.htm
Historical Context
"Musharraf warns India he may use nuclear weapons (Times UK April 6) - Musharraf ready to use nuclear arms (Guardian UK April 1) - India to revive N-safety co-operation with US (Times of India)."
Source: ind-pak-news.htm
Transit Resistance
"We support Argentina and Chile in their efforts to halt the transit of these dangerous nuclear waste shipments through their coastal waters, said Paul Leventhal."
Source: nci_distilled_knowledge.txt

Treaties, Legislation & Policy Action

Policy Recommendation
Context: Plutonium & Reprocessing Getting Rid of Military Plutonium Using plutonium from bombs as fuel for nuclear power reactors invites theft by terrorists and outlaw states. [How to stop this latest attempt at plutonium commerce: Directly dispose of plutonium by burying it with nuclear waste deep in the earth.] IRAQ:
"How to stop this latest attempt at plutonium commerce: Directly dispose of plutonium by burying it with nuclear waste deep in the earth."
Source: about-nci.htm
Title: Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), Washington D.C.
Policy Recommendation
Context: 9:30 paper [The case for nuclear power: Richard Rhodes, author of "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" and "Nuclear Renewal: Common Sense About Energy" 9:50 paper Demand-side alternatives: Amory Lovins, CEO/Research, Rocky Mountain Institute.] 10:10 Discussion 10:30 Break 10:45 paper (PDF) Supply-side alternatives: Robert Williams, Senior Research Scientist, Princeton University.
"The case for nuclear power: Richard Rhodes, author of "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" and "Nuclear Renewal: Common Sense About Energy" 9:50 paper Demand-side alternatives: Amory Lovins, CEO/Research, Rocky Mountain Institute."
Source: conf-program.htm
Title: NCI Conference Program
Entities: Rocky Mountain Institute
Policy Recommendation
Context: 9:30 [The case for nuclear power: Richard Rhodes, author of "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" and "Nuclear Renewal: Common Sense About Energy" 9:50 Demand-side alternatives: Amory Lovins, CEO/Research, Rocky Mountain Institute.] 10:10 Discussion 10:30 Break 10:45 Supply-side alternatives: Robert Williams, Senior Research Scientist, Princeton University.
"The case for nuclear power: Richard Rhodes, author of "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" and "Nuclear Renewal: Common Sense About Energy" 9:50 Demand-side alternatives: Amory Lovins, CEO/Research, Rocky Mountain Institute."
Source: conf-program2.htm
Title: NCI Conference Program
Entities: Rocky Mountain Institute
Treaty / Legislation
Context: He has served as general counsel for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, deputy general counsel for the Agency for International Development, and staff attorney for the Center for Law and Social Policy. [Mr. Greenberg's legal analysis of the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan provided the basis for challenges of the agreement by both foreign affairs committees in Congress and by the Institute and resulted in "clarifications" of the agreement by the Administration with respect to U.S. rights and obligations under the Treaty.] Mr. Greenberg also advises the Institute on nuclear export law and regulations.
"Mr. Greenberg's legal analysis of the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan provided the basis for challenges of the agreement by both foreign affairs committees in Congress and by the Institute and resulted in "clarifications" of the agreement by the Administration with respect to U.S. rights and obligations under the Treaty."
Source: bio.htm
Title: Our Professional Staff
Entities: Treaty, Institute, Congress, Administration
Treaty / Legislation
Context: He has intervened successfully on behalf of the Institute in a number of proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. [The analyses by Mr. Greenberg of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the U.S.-EURATOM agreement have laid the groundwork for the Institute's initiatives on these matters.] He will continue to play a key role in these and other legal aspects of the Institute's program.
"The analyses by Mr. Greenberg of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the U.S.-EURATOM agreement have laid the groundwork for the Institute's initiatives on these matters."
Source: bio.htm
Title: Our Professional Staff
Entities: Institute, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Treaty / Legislation
Context: [1981 Nuclear Club Ad in New York Times Download high resolution version suitable for printing with graphic tools.]
"1981 Nuclear Club Ad in New York Times Download high resolution version suitable for printing with graphic tools."
Source: nci-1981ad.htm
Title: 1981 Nuclear Club Ad in New York Times
Entities: New York Times Download
Treaty / Legislation
Context: Plutonium Air Shipments Plutonium Air Shipments World Map of Plutonium Air Shipment Routes (check out countries that are overflown or are close to the flightpaths) Overview In 1987, the Nuclear Control Institute disclosed that air shipments of extremely toxic plutonium were about to begin from Europe to Japan via Alaska even though industry had failed to develop a shipping cask capable of withstanding a high-velocity crash. [The result of our groundbreaking report: Congress enacted a law barring such shipments, Japan was forced to switch to sea transports of plutonium from Europe, German state licensing authorities blocked air shipments of plutonium fuel to Britain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began a process to establish stricter international standards for shipping plutonium by air.] Now, after more than a decade of deliberations, the IAEA is about to approve a packaging standard that for the first time requires greater crash resistance for air shipments than for land and sea shipments of radioactive materials.
"The result of our groundbreaking report: Congress enacted a law barring such shipments, Japan was forced to switch to sea transports of plutonium from Europe, German state licensing authorities blocked air shipments of plutonium fuel to Britain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began a process to establish stricter international standards for shipping plutonium by air."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: IAEA, Congress, the International Atomic Energy Agency
Treaty / Legislation
Context: The result of our groundbreaking report: Congress enacted a law barring such shipments, Japan was forced to switch to sea transports of plutonium from Europe, German state licensing authorities blocked air shipments of plutonium fuel to Britain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began a process to establish stricter international standards for shipping plutonium by air. [Now, after more than a decade of deliberations, the IAEA is about to approve a packaging standard that for the first time requires greater crash resistance for air shipments than for land and sea shipments of radioactive materials.] But the impending IAEA standard, developed in close coordination with industry, is still considerably weaker than U.S. legal requirements for shipping plutonium by air and international requirements for protecting flight recorders in commercial airliners.
"Now, after more than a decade of deliberations, the IAEA is about to approve a packaging standard that for the first time requires greater crash resistance for air shipments than for land and sea shipments of radioactive materials."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: IAEA
Treaty / Legislation
Context: Now, after more than a decade of deliberations, the IAEA is about to approve a packaging standard that for the first time requires greater crash resistance for air shipments than for land and sea shipments of radioactive materials. [But the impending IAEA standard, developed in close coordination with industry, is still considerably weaker than U.S. legal requirements for shipping plutonium by air and international requirements for protecting flight recorders in commercial airliners.] No plutonium air-shipment cask has ever survived tests against these strict requirements.
"But the impending IAEA standard, developed in close coordination with industry, is still considerably weaker than U.S. legal requirements for shipping plutonium by air and international requirements for protecting flight recorders in commercial airliners."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: IAEA
Treaty / Legislation
Context: No plutonium air-shipment cask has ever survived tests against these strict requirements. [To make matters worse, the new IAEA air-packaging standard has a loophole exempting plutonium when it is shipped in the form that most plutonium is to be shipped---as a mixture of plutonium and uranium (so-called mixed-oxide or MOX) fuel.] Industry's assertion that MOX fuel won't release deadly plutonium in a crash and fire, and therefore can be flown in the weaker existing casks, is deeply flawed and untested.
"To make matters worse, the new IAEA air-packaging standard has a loophole exempting plutonium when it is shipped in the form that most plutonium is to be shipped---as a mixture of plutonium and uranium (so-called mixed-oxide or MOX) fuel."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: MOX, IAEA
Treaty / Legislation
Context: Both the new air-shipment packaging code and the exemption from it put the public at risk. [We are demanding that the IAEA defer action until it develops a code that conforms with strict U.S. requirements and international aviation standards.] If the IAEA proceeds with the new code anyway, we are urging nations along or adjacent to flight paths of plutonium shipments to exercise their legal rights to bar these planes from flying over or near their territories.
"We are demanding that the IAEA defer action until it develops a code that conforms with strict U.S. requirements and international aviation standards."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: IAEA
Treaty / Legislation
Context: We are demanding that the IAEA defer action until it develops a code that conforms with strict U.S. requirements and international aviation standards. [If the IAEA proceeds with the new code anyway, we are urging nations along or adjacent to flight paths of plutonium shipments to exercise their legal rights to bar these planes from flying over or near their territories.] Inadequacy of the IAEA's Air Transport Regulations: The Case of MOX Fuel Technical Paper presented to Dangerous Goods Panel, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), by Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, NCI scientific director, Montreal, Canada, October 24, 1997 The Facts About Air Transport of Mixed-Oxide Fuel: NCI Rebuts BNFL Newsletter of June 12, 1997 NCI Press Release, June 20, 1997 NCI to EC Officials: Ban Air Shipments of Radioactive Material from the European Union Letter to Christos Papoutsis, Commissioner for Energy, European Commission, November 5, 1996.
"If the IAEA proceeds with the new code anyway, we are urging nations along or adjacent to flight paths of plutonium shipments to exercise their legal rights to bar these planes from flying over or near their territories."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: IAEA
Treaty / Legislation
Context: If the IAEA proceeds with the new code anyway, we are urging nations along or adjacent to flight paths of plutonium shipments to exercise their legal rights to bar these planes from flying over or near their territories. [Inadequacy of the IAEA's Air Transport Regulations: The Case of MOX Fuel Technical Paper presented to Dangerous Goods Panel, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), by Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, NCI scientific director, Montreal, Canada, October 24, 1997 The Facts About Air Transport of Mixed-Oxide Fuel: NCI Rebuts BNFL Newsletter of June 12, 1997 NCI Press Release, June 20, 1997 NCI to EC Officials: Ban Air Shipments of Radioactive Material from the European Union Letter to Christos Papoutsis, Commissioner for Energy, European Commission, November 5, 1996.] Similar letters were sent to John Bruton, Prime Minister of Ireland and President of the European Union Councils of Ministers; and to Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner for Transport.
"Inadequacy of the IAEA's Air Transport Regulations: The Case of MOX Fuel Technical Paper presented to Dangerous Goods Panel, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), by Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, NCI scientific director, Montreal, Canada, October 24, 1997 The Facts About Air Transport of Mixed-Oxide Fuel: NCI Rebuts BNFL Newsletter of June 12, 1997 NCI Press Release, June 20, 1997 NCI to EC Officials: Ban Air Shipments of Radioactive Material from the European Union Letter to Christos Papoutsis, Commissioner for Energy, European Commission, November 5, 1996."
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: NCI Press Release, Energy, European Commission, Air Transport Regulations: The Case of MOX Fuel Technical Paper, NCI, IAEA, EC, International Civil Aviation Organization, Dangerous Goods Panel, Christos Papoutsis, the European Union Letter
Policy Recommendation
Context: Lessons of TWA and ValuJet Crashes Are Ignored: International Air Shipments of Deadly Plutonium to be Approved in Casks that Cannot Withstand a Crash IAEA Board Puts Stamp of Approval on Widespread Shipments of Plutonium by Plane Press Release, September 13, 1996 NCI and Greenpeace Press Conference: UN Nuclear Agency Set to Clear the Way for Plutonium Transport by Air Press Release, September 4, 1996 "Status Report on Plutonium Air Shipments" By Sharon Tanzer, NCI backgrounder, August 28, 1996 "Technical Backgrounder: Plutonium Air Shipments" By Edwin Lyman, scientific director, NCI backgrounder, September 4, 1996 "Notable Quotes on Air Shipment of Plutonium" September 4, 1996 Press Advisory August 5, 1996 Air Transport Accident Conditions: Comparison of International and U.S. Safety Standards for Plutonium Air Shipments NCI Exchanges of Correspondence with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Air Transport Association (IATA), and International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA): NCI Letter to ICAO June 17, 1996 (same letter sent to IATA & IFALPA) [ICAO Response to NCI June 28, 1996; NCI Response to ICAO July 29, 1996 IATA Response to NCI July 1, 1996; NCI Response to IATA July 30, 1996 IFALPA Response to NCI July 11, 1996; NCI Response to IFALPA July 29, 1996 German Effort to Weaken Crash Standards For Flying Plutonium Should Be Rejected Press Release , June 19, 1996] NCI letter to Dr. Hans Blix , International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General, on new air transport standard, including technical note by Dr. Edwin Lyman, February 26, 1996 Response from Morris Rosen , IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety, March 25, 1996
"ICAO Response to NCI June 28, 1996; NCI Response to ICAO July 29, 1996 IATA Response to NCI July 1, 1996; NCI Response to IATA July 30, 1996 IFALPA Response to NCI July 11, 1996; NCI Response to IFALPA July 29, 1996 German Effort to Weaken Crash Standards For Flying Plutonium Should Be Rejected Press Release , June 19, 1996"
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: IATA, NCI Response to IFALPA, NCI
Treaty / Legislation
Context: ICAO Response to NCI June 28, 1996; NCI Response to ICAO July 29, 1996 IATA Response to NCI July 1, 1996; NCI Response to IATA July 30, 1996 IFALPA Response to NCI July 11, 1996; NCI Response to IFALPA July 29, 1996 German Effort to Weaken Crash Standards For Flying Plutonium Should Be Rejected Press Release , June 19, 1996 [NCI letter to Dr. Hans Blix , International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General, on new air transport standard, including technical note by Dr. Edwin Lyman, February 26, 1996 Response from Morris Rosen , IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety, March 25, 1996] NCI letter to Morris Rosen , June 14, 1996 NCI Denounces as a Fraud a New IAEA Safety Standard for Air Shipments of Plutonium NCI press release, March 1, 1996 IAEA to Approve German Plan for Plutonium Flights Over Objections Raised by U.S. Government and International Aviation Experts NCI press release, September 25, 1995 "Behavior of Mixed-Oxide Fuel Under Transport Accident Conditions" Edwin S. Lyman, PhD, Scientific Director, Nuclear Control Institute, September 21, 1995 "Questions/Comments Concerning the Air Transport of "Very Low Dispersibility" (VLD) Material" Edwin S. Lyman, PhD, Princeton University, May 8, 1995 British Government Urged to Ban Plutonium Flights for Lack of Crash-Proof Shipping Casks NCI Press Release, August 31, 1994 Germany Ready to Fly Plutonium to Britain in Casks Not Certified as Crashproof NCI Press Release, April 7, 1993 Air Transport of Plutonium Obtained by the Japanese from Nuclear Fuel Controlled by the United States Paul Leventhal, Milton Hoenig, and Alan Kuperman, NCI Special Report, March 3, 1987 Visit our other special section: Radioactive Sea Shipments Japan, Britain & France are beginning to ship plutonium wastes by sea in containers that can't survive a sinking.
"NCI letter to Dr. Hans Blix , International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General, on new air transport standard, including technical note by Dr. Edwin Lyman, February 26, 1996 Response from Morris Rosen , IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety, March 25, 1996"
Source: airtrans.htm
Title: Plutonium Air Shipments
Entities: the Department of Nuclear Safety, International Atomic Energy Agency, NCI, IAEA
Treaty / Legislation
Context: The U.S. government would build and run the system and U.S. taxpayers would pay for it. [Looking at the chaos plaguing the electricity industry today, it is very difficult to imagine that it would ever be able to act as one coordinated unit unless it were nationalized.] As the Roadmap itself concedes, "it is unlikely that the private sector would implement a waste transmutation scheme on its own without incentives ...
"Looking at the chaos plaguing the electricity industry today, it is very difficult to imagine that it would ever be able to act as one coordinated unit unless it were nationalized."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Policy Recommendation
Context: Some people in DOE are aware of this threat, and for this reason have proposed that pyroprocessing, a so-called proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology, be used in the ATW system. [The promoters of pyroprocessing at Argonne National Laboratory-West in Idaho claim that it is a method in which plutonium can be safely recycled, because it never produces plutonium that is pure enough that it can easily be removed undetected, and would require further treatment before it could be used in a nuclear weapon.] Like ATW, it sounds good at first, but the reality falls far short of these claims.
"The promoters of pyroprocessing at Argonne National Laboratory-West in Idaho claim that it is a method in which plutonium can be safely recycled, because it never produces plutonium that is pure enough that it can easily be removed undetected, and would require further treatment before it could be used in a nuclear weapon."
Source: el-atw52401.htm
Title: 5/24/2001 Ed Lyman Statement on ATW, Pyroprocessing
Entities: Argonne National Laboratory-West
Treaty / Legislation
Context: Are India and Pakistan likely to enter into a U.S.-Soviet type of nuclear arms race? [9. Are India and Pakistan now more likely to join international arms control agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?] 10.
"9. Are India and Pakistan now more likely to join international arms control agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?"
Source: ind-pak2.htm
Title: India-Pakistan Nuclear Central
Entities: NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Treaty / Legislation
Context: India, Pakistan, China and the Bomb Paul Leventhal, Testimony before the House Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, May 14, 1998 Indian Nuclear Test Sure to Trigger Arms Race; Signals a Failed Clinton Non-Proliferation Policy NCI Press Release, May 11, 1998 Cut Off Aid to Pakistan Paul Leventhal, Op-Ed Article, Washington Post, October 8, 1990 Pakistan: Update on Democracy and Nuclear Issues Paul Leventhal, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 2, 1990 South Asia: A Framework for Peace Paul Leventhal and Brahma Chellaney, Op-Ed Article, International Herald Tribune, February 1, 1989 Pakistan and U.S. [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Paul Leventhal, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 22, 1987 Legal Challenge to Block Nuclear Exports to India Announced by Six Public-Interest Organizations - Group Press Release, July 28, 1983 - Statement by Paul Leventhal, July 28, 1983 Reagan Administration to Approve Nuclear Exports to India Despite Ban in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act NCI Press Release, June 21, 1983 India-Pakistan Nuclear Documents Is Musharrafs Nuclear Threat to India Real?] Wg.
"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Paul Leventhal, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 22, 1987 Legal Challenge to Block Nuclear Exports to India Announced by Six Public-Interest Organizations - Group Press Release, July 28, 1983 - Statement by Paul Leventhal, July 28, 1983 Reagan Administration to Approve Nuclear Exports to India Despite Ban in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act NCI Press Release, June 21, 1983 India-Pakistan Nuclear Documents Is Musharrafs Nuclear Threat to India Real?"
Source: ind-pak2.htm
Title: India-Pakistan Nuclear Central
Entities: Legal Challenge to Block Nuclear Exports, India Announced, the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Treaty / Legislation
Context: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF Nuclear Control Institute Comments on the Scope and CONTENT of the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Edwin S. Lyman, PhD Scientific Director May 21, 2001 Introduction The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the scope and content of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). [NCI has closely monitored the plutonium disposition program of the Department of Energy (DOE) since its inception, and has commented extensively on the inadequacies of DOEs own National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation for the program.] Now that NRC is in a position to rectify these inadequacies, we hope that it will take full advantage of this opportunity and conduct a thorough assessment of the environmental liabilities of DOEs MOX program, as well as an honest comparison of the MOX approach and its alternatives.
"NCI has closely monitored the plutonium disposition program of the Department of Energy (DOE) since its inception, and has commented extensively on the inadequacies of DOEs own National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation for the program."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: DOE, NCI, NEPA, National Environmental Policy Act, the Department of Energy
Policy Recommendation
Context: In NCIs opinion, all available evidence clearly shows that the immobilization option is superior to MOX with respect to environmental impact, cost, programmatic risk and non-proliferation, and NCI is confident that NRCs own review will reach the same conclusion. [Comments The EIS must evaluate direct and indirect impacts for all the MOX fuel preparation alternatives that are currently being considered by DOE, not only the one reflected in the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) Construction Authorization Request (CAR).] The EIS should also evaluate the all-immobilization option.
"Comments The EIS must evaluate direct and indirect impacts for all the MOX fuel preparation alternatives that are currently being considered by DOE, not only the one reflected in the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) Construction Authorization Request (CAR)."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, DOE, EIS, CAR, MOX
Policy Recommendation
Context: The EIS should also evaluate the all-immobilization option. [Since the spectrum of alternatives will not be known until the completion of a National Security Council (NSC) review on fissile material disposition policy and a DOE technical review of excess plutonium processing options, closure of the scoping process should be delayed until these reviews are publicly available.] DOEs plutonium disposition program is in a state of flux and is rapidly moving away from the preferred alternative identified in the 1999 DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final EIS (SPD FEIS) and confirmed by the subsequent Record of Decision (ROD).
"Since the spectrum of alternatives will not be known until the completion of a National Security Council (NSC) review on fissile material disposition policy and a DOE technical review of excess plutonium processing options, closure of the scoping process should be delayed until these reviews are publicly available."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: National Security Council, NSC, DOE
Policy Recommendation
Context: The cancellation of the PIP would require redesign of the MFFF to accommodate up to 16 metric tons (MT) of excess plutonium in impure forms now slated for immobilization. [For an alternative in which the PIP is cancelled but the PDCF is not, the EIS must evaluate, for example, the impacts of transferring the feed preparation modules for impure materials now designated for immobilization from the PIP to the PDCF and augmenting the MFFF polishing unit so that it is capable of purifying these materials to render them suitable for processing into MOX fuel.] These changes are likely to have a significant effect on MFFF impacts with respect to the areas of waste generation, worker dose and accident consequences.
"For an alternative in which the PIP is cancelled but the PDCF is not, the EIS must evaluate, for example, the impacts of transferring the feed preparation modules for impure materials now designated for immobilization from the PIP to the PDCF and augmenting the MFFF polishing unit so that it is capable of purifying these materials to render them suitable for processing into MOX fuel."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: EIS, MOX, PIP, PDCF
Policy Recommendation
Context: Without this information, it is impossible to do a fair comparison of the environmental and public health impacts of the plutonium disposition alternatives. [DOEs use of accident probability and source term information from the Catawba and McGuire Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) in its reactor accident calculations should receive particular attention from NRC.] NRC staff have questioned the validity of the early containment failure frequencies contained in these reports, since they appear to underestimate the risk of ice condenser containment failure due to hydrogen combustion during station blackout events, and a recent NRC-sponsored report by Sandia National Laboratories (NUREG/CR-6427) has confirmed that the vulnerability of ice condenser containments to hydrogen explosions is considerably greater than the results of the IPEs would suggest.
"DOEs use of accident probability and source term information from the Catawba and McGuire Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) in its reactor accident calculations should receive particular attention from NRC."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: McGuire Individual Plant Examinations, NRC
Policy Recommendation
Context: NRC should also take the advice that it provided to DCS in preparing its own EIS by ensuring that all calculations are fully documented and repeatable by interested readers. [It must be noted that significant technical uncertainties and unresolved safety issues exist, especially with regard to MOX irradiation.] For instance, it is not known whether severe accident radionuclide release fractions derived for uranium fuel will be appropriate for MOX fuel.
"It must be noted that significant technical uncertainties and unresolved safety issues exist, especially with regard to MOX irradiation."
Source: el-mox52101.htm
Title: 5/21/01 Ed Lyman Scoping Comments on MOX FFF
Entities: MOX
Treaty / Legislation
Context: The president and executive director, Paul Leventhal, went on to senior staff positions in the U.S. Senate on nuclear energy issues. [He was responsible for the 1974 law breaking up the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission into independent regulatory and promotional agencies, and for the investigation and legislation leading to stricter controls over U.S. nuclear exports enacted in the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.]
"He was responsible for the 1974 law breaking up the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission into independent regulatory and promotional agencies, and for the investigation and legislation leading to stricter controls over U.S. nuclear exports enacted in the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978."
Source: aboutus.htm
Title: About the Nuclear Control Institute
Entities: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
Treaty / Legislation
Context: The security surrounding critical facilities remains woefully inadequate despite previous warnings. [But let me just close by thanking each of the 23 panelists today for sharing their insights and concerns regarding the OSRE program and the NRC recommendations overall for the program for safeguards performance assessment.]
"But let me just close by thanking each of the panelists today for sharing their insights and concerns regarding the OSRE program and the NRC recommendations overall for the program for safeguards performance assessment."
Source: nrctrans0505.html
Title: Safeguards Performance Assessment
Entities: NRC
Treaty / Legislation
Context: The threat parameters must be updated to reflect reality. [The point, however, is that, with regard to the truck bomb rule promulgated in 1994, we have reason to believe that it is insufficient to protect against the larger terrorist bombs used since the time the rule was promulgated in response to the World Trade Center explosion.]
"The point, however, is that, with regard to the truck bomb rule promulgated in 1994, we have reason to believe that it is insufficient to protect against the larger terrorist bombs used since the time the rule was promulgated in response to the World Trade Center explosion."
Source: nrctrans0505.html
Title: Truck Bomb Rule
Entities: None
Policy Recommendation
Context: The international community must hold these actors accountable. [It would be a treaty violation and a national disaster if any attempt were made to divert commercially separated plutonium.]
"It would be a treaty violation and a national disaster if any attempt were made to divert commercially separated plutonium."
Source: index.htm
Title: NCI Front Page Warning
Entities: None